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Faculty and Deans

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA- THE LA\V TODAY::•
Captain Frederic I. Lederer ::::::
I.

INTRODUCTION

You have the right to remain silent; anything you say
may be used against you at t1-ial; you hm'e a 1·ight to con·
sult with a lawyer and t.o have a lawyer present during
this interrogation and if you cannot a.[{01·d a lawye1· one
will be appointed j01· you.

Thus speaks the Supreme Court in Miranda l'. Arizona, 1 surely
one of the Court's most controversial decisions in criminal law, and
one almost certain to be modified by the Court in the near future.
The decision is complex and will be discussed at length later. However, it is important to note at this point that the decision in
Miranda supplied an affirmative duty on the part of police desiring
to conduct custodial interrogations to warn an accused of his right to
remain silent and of a right to counsel at interrogations far broader
than had ever existed before the decision. Contrary to some impressions, the basic nature of Mimnda was far from unpredictablewhat was unusual was the specificity found within the opinion and
the strictness with which it had to be applied to be of value.
The history of the Supreme Court's dealings with the confession
problem is a story of partially futile attempts to find a tool with
which to control improper police conduct. In the development of the
contemporary law of confessions, the tool the Court ultimately
seized was the right to counsel. This right was considered, if not the
perfect tool, at least far better than its nearest competitors. The
first decision of nationwide scope was Massiah v. United States, 2
finding a sixth amendment right to counsel at post-indictment inter*The opinions and conclusions presented in this article are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School or
any other governmental agency.
** JAGC, U.S. Army. Instructor, Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate
General's School, on extended leave to study European criminal law on a
Fulbright-Hays Fellowship at the Max Planck Institut fur auslandisches und internationales Strafrecht, at Freiburg, Germany. B.S., 1968, Polytechnic Institute
of New York; J.D., 1971, Columbia University; LL.M., 1976, and S.J.D. candidate, University of Virginia. Member ofthe Bars of New York, the United States
Court of :Military Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The warnings listed represent only one variation of those in
general use, and do not include the required waiver questions.
2 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Court had previously been disturbed by police interfer-
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rogations when the defendant had retained counsel. Massialt was
followed in a few months by Escobedo v. Illinois. 3
Within the military service, a requirement for counsel warnings
has been in effect since at least the 1967 decision of the Court of
Military Appeals in the case of United States v. Tempia. 4

II. ESCOBEDO V. ILLINOIS
On January 19, 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatally shot. Escobedo was arrested, interrogated and released the
next day. On January 30th an accomplice turned state's evidence,
and r,scr bedo was arrested and taken to the police station. During
the ride to the station house Escobedo refused to answer questions,
stating that he wanted advice from his lawyer. 5
Notified by the mother of a friend, Escobedo's lawyer arrived at
the station house soon after Escobedo. Despite his best efforts, in
which he spoke to virtually every policeman in the area including
the chief of police, the lawyer was refused permission to speak with
his client until questioning was completed. Escobedo repeatedly requested permission to see his counsel. Confronted with an accusation that his accomplice had blamed the crime on him, Escobedo
admitted participation in the crime. At trial Escobedo's motions to
suppress the statements were overruled. The Supreme Court reversed on right-to-counsel grounds. Through Mr. Justice Goldberg,
ence with a suspect':> desire to contact counsel. See Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963) (police refused to allow accused to call wife or attorney).
3 378 u.s. 478 (1964).
4 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.l\LR. 249 (1967). See Lederer, Rights Warnings in the
Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1976). While there is some small confusion
relating to the right to counsel at interrogations prior to Miranda v. Arizona, it
appears that the Court of Military Appeals, apparently applying the sixth amendment, had held that a suspect who requested counsel had a right to consult with a
lawyer. See United States v. Wimberley, 16 C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966);
United States v. Rose, 8 C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957); United States v.
Gunnels, 8 C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957). The right to consult with counsel
meant only that the suspect had the right to speak with privately retained counsel
or the staff judge advocate or his representative. It did not include the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation and did not include the right to have
counsel appointed for any but the most limited purpose. See Wimberley, 16
C.l\l.A. at 10, 36 C.M.R. at 166. But see Gunnels, 8 C.M.A. at 139, 23 C.l\I.R. at
359. Clearly no right existed for a suspect to be warned of his limited right to
consult with counsel. Wimberley, 16 C.M.A. at 10, 36 C.M.R. at 166. Miranda
was adopted by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Tempia, 16
C. M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). While it seems far from clear, it would appear
that the pre-Tempia decisions of the Court of Military Appeals were implicitly
overruled by Tempia, requiring one to presume that the primary right to counsel
at interrogations is found only in the fifth and sixth amendments as interpreted by
Miranda.
5 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479.
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the Court reasoned that when Escobedo was refused the right to
see his lawyer he had become an accused and the pw·pose of the
interrogation was to "get him." 6 According to Mr. Justice
Goldberg, "it would exalt form over substance to make right to
counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time
of interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment.
Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with
murder." 7 Thus, the Court's prior decision in Massiah was extended to the Escobedo fact pattern.
The decision was otherwise buttressed by stating that for the
right to counsel at trial to have any meaning counsel would be
necessary at pretrial interrogation, for otherwise the conviction
would already have been assured. 8 Interrogation was thus a "critical stage." The holding of the case was stated thusly:
Where . . . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody. the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. the
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of
the Sixth Amendment .... 9

Surely a more limited decision could scarcely have been imagined.
Yet Mr. Justice White, 10 dissenting, viewed the decision more expansively, stating that "[a]t the very least the Court holds that once
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any
admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence
unless the accused has waived his right to counsel." 11 As time
proved, Justice White's prediction was remarkably accw·ate. Taken
at his word, however, Justice Goldberg's decision was limited to
cases in which a defendant was made aware of his right to remain
silent and requested and was refused access to his counsel. A warning of the right to counsel was not required. Further, for Escobedo
to apply, the investigation had to have "focused" on the accused who
had also to have been taken into custody. The definition of focus was
left open.
6

I d. at 485.

7

I d. at 486.
I d. at 487, citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) <Black, J. in an opinion

8

joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas and Brennan JJ., dissenting).
9 I d. at 490-91.
10 I d. at 495.
11 Id.
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Ultimately, Escobedo, a limited decision when taken at its word,
proved of limited value. 12 Far more important was the use of the
decision as a stepping stone to what Justice White feared was likely,
the case of Miranda v. Arizona.

III. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

13

The Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois 14 left the
law of confessions in uncertainty. While the decision itself had been
narrow and virtually limited to the facts of the case, potential for
broad expansion was clearly evident. Deeply concerned by the need
to predict the Supreme Court's ultimate interpretation of the fifth
amendment, the organized bar struggled to delimit the final boundaries of the Escobedo decision. 15 Foremost among the questions left
by Escobedo were:
When did a suspect who desired to see retained counsel
have a right to see him?
Did a suspect who desired counsel during or before interrogation but who lacked the funds to retain one have a
right to have one appointed free of charge?
Did government interrogators have to affirmatively warn
suspects of their right to counsel prior to interrogation?
The questions left by Escobedo were almost solely ones relating
to a right to counsel. At stake was the suspect's right to consult
12
Taken literally, the opinion was of little consequence. However, the case
rapidly came to be viewed as prescribing a right to counsel whenever an investiga·
tion had "focused" on a suspect subjected to police interrogation. The definition of
"focus" defied easy resolution until it was subsumed into Miranda's definition of
"custody." Escobedo was, in one respect, a critical decision for it clearly extended
the right to counsel to the investigatory process. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting,
found this particularly objectionable: "[T]he vital fact remains that this case docs
not involve the deliberate interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings against him," 378 U.S. at 492; and

the Court today converts a routine police investigation ... into a distorted analogue of a judi·
cial trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts historically applicable only
after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so, I think the Court perverts
those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital Interests of society In pro·
serving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police Investigation.

378 U.S. at 494.
384 u.s. 436 (1966).
1 4 378 u.s. 478 (1964).
15 See, Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 440 at n.2 (1966). Ultimately, the Court held Escobedo to its facts. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974), citing Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966).
13
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with a lawyer prior to or during a custodial interrogation. The right
to counsel became the focal point of the problem because of the
Court's belief that the police-dominated atmosphere surrounding
most interrogations could be offset only by the presence of a lawyer
whose sole responsibility was to the suspect. Ultimately of course
the post-Escobedo issues reached the Supreme Court.
The vehicle which the Court chose to resolve the Escobedo problems was Miranda, consolidated with three other cases, 16 all of
which raised related fifth amendment and confession problems.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the individual
cases, it is important to point out that as a group they included most
of the factual variations important to an attempted definitive resolution of the Escobedo issues. Both state and federal cases were
included; warnings of one type or another had been given in some
cases but not in others. 17 Similarly, while the relief requested in
each case was identical, the reversal of a conviction, or the affirmance of a reversal, the legal arguments raised by the various defendants varied from a limited reliance on the due process voluntariness doctline to a claim that the Constitution required automatic
assignment of counsel before a custodial interrogation could yield
admissible evidence. In almost all the cases the defendants placed
their primary reliance on the fifth amendment right against selfinclimination, arguing that the right to counsel was essential to a
realistic exercise of the privilege.
Vignera v. New York; Westover v. United States; and California v. Stewart,
consolidated with .Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17 Miranda, Vignera, and Steu·art were state cases, while U'estot·er \\'a8 a federal
case. In Miranda, the accused was suspected of rape and kidnapping. After a
lineup in which Miranda was identified, he was interrogated without prior warn·
ings for about thirty minutes after which he confessed. Prior to trial, a court·
ordered psychiatric examination found Miranda to be an immature 23-year-old
with an 8th grade education, with a prior record and a sociopathic personality
disorder or disturbance since an early age. The written confession ultimately
signed by .Miranda contained a paragraph stating that it was given voluntarily and
with knowledge that it could be used against him. At trial the defense counsel
objected to its admission on the grounds that the defendant had had a right to
counsel at the time of his arrest.
Vignera was arrested for armed robbery of a dress shop. He confessed to police
after arrest and after a successful lineup. Subsequently, Vignera made a full confession again to an assistant district attorney. This confession, recorded by a
stenographer, was admitted against Vignera at trial over defense objection.
In Stewart, the defendant was charged with robbery and murder. Stewart \\'a8
questioned after a successful search of his house. He made a number of admi8sions
during three days of questioning. On the fifth day of questioning he admitted the
robbery of the murder victim, although not the murder or the other robberies he
16
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Perhaps the best and most comprehensive argument was made by
the America! Civil Liberties Union appearing as amicus curiae: 18
The protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege afforded by the
presence of counsel in police custodial interrogation designed to elicit
a confession has been spelled out in other briefs in this case, is well
known to this Court, and therefore, can be here quickly summarized.
These include giving an effective warning of the suspect's privilege
"to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his will"; providing someone in whom the subject can confide and
who is a contact between the subject and the outside world; assuring
that if the subject chooses to tell his story, he does so in a way that
conveys his intended meaning; and providing an outside observer to
the interrogation proceedings.
Obviously an effective warning of the privilege is a keystone of its
effective enforcement. It is equally clear that there is a need to provide the presence of someone at interrogation in whom the subject
can confide and who will bolster his confidence. As discussed above, it
is a prime function of police custodial incommunicado interrogation to
tear a subject away from all things on which he can rely for support
and place him in complete subservience to the interrogator. The aim
is to have him dominated by the interrogator. In order to dispel such
circumstances, therefore, it is manifestly necessary that the incommunicado environment be eliminated. The presence of counsel will
tend to accomplish this aim. Not only is counsel a person outside the
police force, he is one who can meet the accomplished police interrogator on a level of at least partial equality. By training and experience he should not be afraid to stand up to unrestrained governmental
power. He is someone in whom the subject can freely confide. It is his

was charged with. The statements were apparently made without warnings and
without a request for counsel. They were received into evidence against Stewart.
After the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction for failure to supply
counsel, utilizing the expansive reading of Escobedo, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), the State of California appealed. The
defense reply appears to have argued reliance on due process voluntariness as
well as right to counsel.
Westover was arrested by Kansas City police on suspicion of robbery and was
then held for the FBI because of possible involvement in two California robberies.
The FBI interrogated Westover in the Kansas City jail after the local police had
completed their own questioning. Westover was first advised by the FBI that he
had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in a
court of law, and that he had the right to consult with an attorney. Westover then
confessed. He made similar statements with corrections the day after and was
finally arraigned on federal charges eleven days after the initial state arrest. At
the Supreme Court the defense claimed that Westover should have been actually
supplied with counsel. Further, the delay in arraignment was attacked. See J.
MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATO!IIY OF A SUPREME COURT
DECISION 31-42 (1966).
18
Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, at 21-23, reprinted
in Medalie at 66-67.
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job to be a whole-hearted advoeate for the subject with no conflicting
interests in this regard.
In order to make effective the privilege against self-incrimination it is
also necessary to ensure that if a person desires to tell his story h~ is
allowed to do so in a way that conveys his intended meaning. A police
interrogator, however, is basically an accomplished cross-examiner
who is trained to allude to a particular piece of incriminating evidence
but then to "be on guard to shut off immediately any explanation the
subject may start to offer at that time." Counsel present will tend to
ensure that the accused has a real opportunity, if he so desires, to tell
his story effectively and to eliminate distortions and ambiguities. In
short, counsel can aid in examining the accused so that his :;tory
comes out as he aims to tell it as well as protecting him from unrestrained cross-examination .... 19

Appeals to the sixth amendment right to counsel, though present,
were rare. Just as the claims made by the convicted defendants
were quite varied in scope, so too did the positions taken by the
counsel for the state and federal prosecution vary widely, ranging
from an outright denial of any right to counsel or warnings to the
comparatively mild position taken by then Solicitor General Marshall 20 in which he conceded the right to counsel at interrogations
but denied the need to warn suspects of the existence of that
right. 21 Government counsel were united in their concern for the
possible consequences to law enforcement that might flow from an
absolute right to counsel at interrogations. 22

ts I d.
20

Now Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall of the Supreme Court.
See, J. MEDALIE, supra note 17, at 133-34, 140. Marshall belie\•ed that a defendant had a right to see his own counsel but that the Government was not required to appoint a lawyer for an accused without counsel. While he supported the
concept of warnings as a matter of policy or procedure, he denied that the Constitution required such warnings.
Note that official transcripts of Supreme Court arguments are not available.
However, in view of the importance of Miranda and its associated case,;, a private
transcript was made by the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure of the
Georgetown University Law Center, portions of which are reprinted in J.
MEDALIE, supra note 17, at 77-188, and in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 531-39 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
KAMISAR].
22
Counsel asserted that the consequences of such a right would be se\'ere. On the
one hand it was assumed that it would be impossible to supply the number of
lawyers needed, and on the other that defense counsel would automatically tell
their clients to remain silent. Any way that the prosecution viewed the situation,
the usefulness of interrogation would be nil. It is interesting to compare these dire
predictions with the actual results of llfirmrda; it appears that most suspects
routinely waive their rights to counsel and to remain silent.
21
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The Supreme Court's decision became of course even more controversial than its earlier decision in Escobedo. The Court
announced a prospective rule 23 that required police desiring to conduct a custodial interrogation to warn a suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to have and consult with a lawyer at the
interrogation. In the oft quoted critical passage of the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages
which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there
can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and incHcates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned. 24

Although a definitive analysis of the Miranda decision is beyond
the scope of this work, it can be suggested that the Court's decision
flows smoothly from its earlier voluntariness decisions. One can
only presume that incommunicado custodial police interrogation
23

The Court subsequently announced that Miranda applied only to cases the trial
of which began after June 13, 1966, the date of the decision in Miranda. Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974), allowing use of derivative evidence obtained in a pre-Miranda interrogation. The Court has also held Miranda inapplicable to statements obtained before
Miranda but used in retrial taking place after Miranda. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395
U.S. 213 (1969). Note that state rules may differ and be more beneficial to an
accused. See Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1975).
24
384 U.S. at 444-45 (footnotes omitted).
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tends to be inherently coercive 25 and accordingly must be compensated for through the giving of an explanation of a suspect's rights
and through the extension of a right to a lawyer at the interrogation. The Court drew such a conclusion relying upon the fact, as it
viewed it, that modern custodial interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented. The right to counsel then was the
"protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation." 26 The Court also noted that without protections dw·ing
pretrial interrogation, all the safeguards supplied at trial would become empty formalities. 27
The holding of the Miranda decision can thus be viewed as an
extension of the voluntariness doctrine. The critical parts of the decision extend the right to counsel to custodial interrogations, 28 require that the suspect in such a setting be informed of his rights,
and require an affirmative waiver before questioning can take place.
Having once recognized not only the right of a suspect to consult
with a lawyer at an interrogation, but the desirability of such representation, the Court was faced with problems of equal protection.
Those who were wealthy enough to have counsel would receive not
only full information as to their right to remain silent but also tactical advice and assistance and the psychological support the Court
deemed vital to overcome the coercive station house atmosphere.
Those too poor to have counsel would automatically be placed in a
far more vulnerable and dangerous position.
Faced with a dichotomy in result based solely on economic factors, the Court chose not to regard the presence of counsel on behalf
of those who could afford them as a lucky gratuitous assist but
rather a basic dilemma which could be resolved only by granting the
right to counsel to all regardless of indigency. Thus the core of the
25

The Supreme Court has consistently held that police custody and questioning
are not "inherently coercive" so as to render a statement involuntary. See Bram
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 556-58 (1897). However, Mira11da lea\'es the
reader with the unmistakable impression that the Court finally held otherwise.
Certainly it is not the type of "inherent coercion" that makes all statements in·
voluntary, for spontaneous statements are admissible without warnings of counsel, and the .Miranda rights can be waived despite custodial circumstances. Ac·
cordingly, the term "inherently coercive" is used here in an attempt to describe
accurately the Court's reasoning despite clear restrictions on the ultimate utility
of the expression.
2s 384 U.S. at 465.
27 I d. at 466, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1964).
28 If, after being warned, the suspect requests counsel and counsel is unavailable,
the police may not question him. The police always have the option of making
counsel available or not interrogating.
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Miranda decision is its affirmative extension of the right to counsel
to all suspects subjected to custodial interrogation. The rights warnings required by the opinion not only directly implement the right
against self-incrimination by informing suspects of its existence, but
also support the right via the warning that the suspect may have
counsel present to assist him regardless of possible poverty.
Perhaps as important as the Court's holding, however, is the additional language which accompanies it. The Court did not announce
hard and fast rules; it expressly recognized the possibility of
superior safeguards being created for custodial questioning of suspects:29 Having done so, it simply stated that until such safeguards
were developed by a jurisdiction, the right to counsel, accompanied
by its warnings, was to be given before resulting evidence could be
admissible at trial. 30

IV.

OBJECTIONS TO MIRANDA

Criticism of Miranda has taken many forms, not the least of
which has been a broadside attack on the decision's entire holding.
Perhaps best expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, 31 such a
view finds the expansion of the right to counsel to interrogations to
be both unfounded in precedent and necessity.
Justice Harlan took issue with the majority's attempt to eliminate
all possibilities of coercion in its attempt to create what he viewed
as a utopian conception of voluntariness. 32 Justice Harlan viewed
some form of pressure as inherent in interrogation and felt that unacceptable forms of pressure could easily be dealt with via the
Court's earlier voluntariness precedents. Showing a keen degree of
insight, he also questioned the validity of the waiver allowed by
Miranda, asking how such a waiver could be voluntary when the
right to counsel itself had been extended to cope with what was
viewed as inherent coercion. Similarly, he asked how spontaneous
statements uttered in a custodial setting could be considered voluntary when the answer to the simplest question, unaccompanied by
the required waiver, would be inadmissible.
384 U.S. at 467. Note that the Court later classified the warning requirements
of Miranda as only "prophylactic rules developed to protect" the right against
self-incrimination. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
30 It now seems apparent that the Court is preparing to modify the Miranda
warning requirement.
31
384 U.S. 436, 504 (Harlan, J. dissenting, joined by Stewart and White, JJ .).
32
/d. at 505. Mr. Justice Harlan also questioned the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the police station house, claiming that historically the
privilege had been inapplicable to "extra-legal confessions." !d. at 510.
29
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Justice Harlan, like many others, also assumed that a lawyer
present during an interrogation would normally advise his client to
remain silent. Accordingly, he felt that the Miranda opinion would
substantially interfere with necessary police investigation \\ithout
adequate justification. While the recognition of a right to counsel at
inten-ogations was the heart of Mimnda, its requirement that a
suspect be warned of his rights to counsel and to remain silent were
also questioned.
The majority opinion referred to the experience of a number of
agencies 33 and foreign jurisdictions 34 which utilized rights warnings. While the FBI, military, and English experiences all appeared
relevant, only one 35 of the jurisdictions utilized a right to counsel at
inten-ogations 36 and accordingly the experience of those jw·isdictions had at best limited validity for general American application.
The English 37 Judges' Rules, cited by the Court, did require that
33

The Court cited with approval the warnings required by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation pursuant to departmental instruction, and the warning~> required to
be given in the military prior to criminal investigation, UNIFORM CODE OF lliL·
ITARY JUSTICE art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1970) (hereinafter cited as UCMJ).
384 U.S. at 483-86, 489.
34
The Court referred to safeguards found at the time in England, Scotland, India,
and Ceylon. 384 U.S. 436, 486-89. See note 37 infra.
35
While the FBI gave a right to counsel warning, it did not include the right to
obtain counsel for indigents until counsel was granted by a judge and it did not
include the affirmative waiver apparently required by .\fira11da. 384 U.S. 436,
521.
36
While the right to counsel, apparently based on sixth amendment considerations, had been evolving in the military, see United States\', Wimberley, 16
C.:M:.A. 3. 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966), the cases cited by the Supreme Court, 384 U.S.
at 489 n.63, only recognized that a suspect who requested a lawyer had to be
allowed to consult with an attorney. Thus, military experience supplied minimal
support for the Court's holding as to counsel warnings. The statutory military
rights warnings did not include a right to counsel. See gellt'rally, Lederer, Rights
Warnings in the Anned Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 0976). However, the statutory warnings had not caused any great difficulty in military police investigations.
37
As presently promulgated, the JUDGES' RULES state:
JUDGES' RULES
These Rules do not affect the principles
(a) That citizens have a duty to help a police officer to dlsro\·~r ar.d

app~l:or.d orf~r.rlorn,

(b)

That police officers, otherwise than by arrest, canr.ot compel any perum asalr.>t bl•

(c)

That every person at any stage or an in\'estigation •hould bto nblo to rommunl<nto acd
to consult privately with a solid tor. This is so ~\·en if he b in cuotody pro,·idc:od that In
such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is cau•<d to tho prO« OS<'> of in\'ooUga·
tion or the administration or justice by his doing so;

!d)

That when a police officer who is making enquiries of any porson about an of(or."" hao
enough e\•idenre to prefer a charge against that person for tho orrrr.><", he ohoutd l:l'itb·
out delay cause that person to be charged or informed that he may be pro:l<'cutl'd (,,.
the orrence;

will to come to or remain in any police sW.tion:
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suspects be informed of their right to remain silent but not only
lacked a right to counsel but were and are enforced at the discretion
of the trial judge who may choose to admit evidence seized in violation of the Rules.
Accordingly, the Miranda warnings requirements had to be regarded as experimental and possibly dangerous to society. Even
now it is difficult to judge how effective the warning requirements
That it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any person,
equally of any oral answer given by that person to a question put by a police otricer and
of any statement made by that person, that it shall have been voluntary, in the sense
that it has not been obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exer·
cised or held out by a person in authority, or by oppression.
The principle set out in paragraph (e) above is overriding and applicable In all cases. Within
that principle the following Rules are put forward as a guide to pollee officers conducting in·
vestigations. Non-conformity with these Rules may render answers and statements liable to bo
excluded from evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.
I. When a police officer is trying to discover whether, or by whom, an offence has boon
committed he is entitled to question any person, whether suspected or not, from whom ho
thinks that useful information may be obtained. This is so whether or not the person in quos·
tion has been taken into custody so long as he has not been charged with the offence or Informed that he may be prosecuted for it.
II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for sUS·
pecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to bo
cautioned before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating to that offence.
The caution shall be in the following terms:"You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may bo
put into writing and given in evidence."
When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a
record shall be kept of the time and place at which any such questioning or statt>ment began
and ended and of the persons present.
!Il.(a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offence
he shall be cautioned in the following terms:" Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do
so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence."
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should be put to tho
accused person after he has been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. Such quos·
tions may be put where they are necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or
loss to some other person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity In a previous answer
(e)

or statement.

Before any such questions are put the accused should be cautioned in these terms:" I wish to put some questions to you about the offence with which you have been charged
(or about the offence for which you may be prosecuted). You are not obliged to answer any
of these questions, but if you do the questions and answers will be taken down in writing
and may be given in evidence."
Any questions put and answers given relating to the offence must be contemporaneously
recorded in full and the record signed by that person or if he refuses by the interrogating
officer.
(c) When such a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a recor<l shall
be kept of the time and place at which every questioning or statement began and ended and of
the persons present.
IV. All written statements made after caution shall be taken in the following mnnner:(a) If a person says that he wants to make a statement he shall be told that it is intended
to make a written record of what he says.
He shall always be asked whether he wisheo to write down himself what he wants to
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are. 38 Of course there is every logical justification to require that
suspects be warned of their right to remain silent if only because
the fifth amendment privilege would seem a useless formality if
suspects are not made aware of its existence.
Another objection to thE' .Miranda decision has been that the
Court seemingly abandoned its judicial role and functioned as a
legislature. Certainly the specificity of its holding makes such a
criticism highly telling. Yet the objection ignores the central issue.
The Court certainly has the constitutional responsibility to interpret
the Constitution. Arguably it may also have increased responsibility
say; if he says that he cannot writt> or that hf' \\OUid IUo:t> "'(lmttonr t~;• untco It (ur h1m.
a police officer may offer to write the Hatement for him. If hr 3CC't"pt• tl:o of{~r thr
police officer shall. before startini:. af'.k thE' per:<on maklni: th._. ~tnttomcont tn "l(:n. •..1r
make his mark to. the following-.. I.------------ - - -· wish to m:~kP a ~tatl"mf'nt J uant 14Jmttonr:o to untt- th..~un
what I say. I ha\·e been told that I need not say anything unl•., I u·'"h to 11•> "' ar.ll
that what(>ver I ~ay may be gi\'Pn in e\·idlmC'E' ••
(b) Any per.on writing his own statement shall be allowed to do •o without an) pro>mpun~:
as distinct from indicating to him \\hat mattf'rs arf' matf'rial
(c)

The person making the statement. If he IS go1ng to wnte it hlm•rlf. •hall t.., Mkt'd to
write out and sign before writing wh:1t he want"" to t><J.)'. tht> (oiiiJwin~:--

"'>'

"1 make thi• statement of my own free "111 I ha\·~ b••n told that I nrt'd nnt
anything unless J wish to do so and that whnt<•'•t'r 1 say may bf' h"l\"f!'n tn t>\'tt.!l"r.tt-. ••
(d) Whenever a police offirer writes the statement, h• •hall take dou·n tb exart

..,..,,,Jo

spoken by the pef'on making the statement. \\lthout putting ony qu•ouon• otl:•r than
such as may be needed to make the otntement coh•l'l'nt. Intelligible nr.d relr\'ant tn th<"
material matters: he shall not prompt hsm .
(e)

When the writing of a statement b~· " police offirer IS fini•hrd the prroon makln~: It
shall be asked to read it and to make any correction•. :tltrrntion• or addltloM h•
vdshes. When he has finished reading it he shall be asked to u·nt<> and sign or mnkr hi•
mark on the following Certific:tte at the end of the 8tatem•nt·"l have read the abo\·e statement and I have been told that I ron corn-ct. olt<"r or
add anything I wish. This statement is true I ho\'<' mod• It of my ou n free u-s II ..

(/) If the person who has made a statement refus•s to r•nd it or to write tb ab<:l\·r mrn·

tioned Certificate at the end of it or to sign it. the senior policr offi~r pre«"nl •hall
record on the statement itself and in the presence of th• penon making lt. u hat ha•
happened. If the per.on making the statement rnnnot rt'od. or r•fu5e• to rt'>.d 11. tb
officer who bas taken it down shall rend it over to him and ask him whrtl::or bo ..,.auld
like to correct, alter or add anything and to put his signature or mala• luo mark ot thr
end. The police officer shall then certify on th• 6tatement itO<'If what br hM dor:r
V. If at any time after a person has been charged "'it h. or ha. been informed that h<' may t>•
prosecuted for an offence a police officer wishes to bnng to the notlC't" of that pen<on any U"Mt·
ten statement made by another person who in respect of the rome offen«' boo abo l:>•rn
charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. he shall hond to that penon n lnlr copy of ourh
written statement. but nothing shall be said or done to in\'lte any rrply or "''mmrr.t. If that
person says that he would like to make o statement in reply. or •tnrto to ""Y •oa:rtlung, hr
shall at once be cautioned or further cautioned as prer.<ribed by Rule Ill to).
VI. Persons other than police offioers charged with the duty of lnv•otil:llllnj; offer.••• or
charging offender. shall. so far as may be prnrtirnbiP. romply with I bOt' Ruleo.

HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR No. 31/1964, APP. A, JUDGES' RULES AND AD!.IINISTRA·
TIVE DIRECTIONS TO THE POLICE (London, 1964) (hereinafter cited as JUDGES'
RULES] . Note that the Administrative Directions ha\'e been omitted.
38

See section XIII, infra.
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in the area of the administration of justice. The Court had been confronted with decades of coerced confessions. Faced with the perception that abuse of individual rights had taken a new and more
difficult-to-detect turn-that psychological coercion was now superseding physical brutality-the Court chose the only instrument it
could find to cope with its constitutional responsibilities. Further, it
recognized the possibility of alternative forms of protection for the
individual's right against self-incrimination and expressly noted that
its decision was not meant to be the only acceptable solution.
While the long term vitality of Miranda is questionable, 39 it not
only is the law at present but also is highly likely to remain important if not determinative in the future. Accordingly, the remainder
of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the Miranda decision as
it has been interpreted by the courts of the United States.

V.

THE MIRANDA REQUIREMENTS,
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Despite the Supreme Court's unusual attempt to be specific in the
Miranda holding, the Court left open a substantial number of questions dealing with the application of its decision. Not only was there
some doubt as to the exact nature of the warnings required, but
more importantly it was unclear when the warnings had to be given.
After all, the Court had used the words "custodial interrogation,"
words open to some debate. Was the question of an arresting officer
on the street the type of "interrogation" that the Court had meant
to include within Miranda's ambit? What test was to be used to
determine the presence of custody? Was it a subjective test-and if
so, was it the suspect's or policeman's view that was to be
determinative-or an objective one? What manner of waiver was to
be required? Was the case to be applied in a relaxed fashion or
perhaps in a hyper-technical one? Further, what obligations did the
decision place on the police when a suspect exercised his rights to
remain silent? Could he be asked to reconsider and was any violation fatal in all ways to resulting evidence? These and other questions flowed from Miranda.
In order to analyze best the contemporary interpretation of
Miranda, the following questions will be addressed in turn:
What warnings must be given?
Who must give warnings?
39

!d.
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Who must receive warnings?
When must warnings be given?
How is the Mimnda waiver obtained?
What is the effect of exercising one's Miranda rights?

VI.

THE MIRANDA WARNINGS

At first impression, the Court would seem to have been more than
adequately specific in its rendition of the warnings required by
Miranda. The Court's language states: "the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 40
Later in the opinion, the Court makes it clear that the latter warning means not only that the suspect has a right to consult with an
attorney, but that "if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him." 41 Beyond this the opinion is silent.
Despite the seeming clarity of the Miranda requirements,
numerous courts have been compelled to interpret the validity of
variations on the Miranda commandments. Most of these cases
would appear to have been concerned with the right-to-counsel
warning although a respectable number of cases exist considering
the other warnings and suggesting that still further warnings may
be necessary.

A.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Miranda requires that a suspect entitled to warnings be warned
that he has a right to have an attorney present during the interrogation and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him. 42 Failure to advise a suspect of his right to _f1·ee counsel is
usually considered noncompliance with Mimnda 43 and fatal to the
admissibility of any resulting statement. 44
While the use of the word "attorney" rather than "lawyer" has
40

384

u.s. 436, 444 (1966).

I d. at 473.
42 I d.
41

See United States v. Cullinan, 396 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ill. 1975); People v.
Hermance, 35 N.Y. 2d 915,324 N.E. 2d 367, _ N.Y.S.2d _ (1974). Note Bat·
teaste v. State, _Ala. App. _ , 331 So. 2d 832 (Ct. Crim. App. 1976), holding
that the warning that if the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed
for him need not include the specific statement that such a lawyer will be "'free of
charge."
44 See Commonwealth v. Bomberger, 454 Pa. 279, 347 A.2d 460 (1975). For an
43
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been controverted, there appears little general objection to the use
of the term attorney. Far more important has been the question of
exactly when the right to counsel attaches in relation to the warning
given by the police to the suspect. The suspect has a right to consult
with counsel before interrogation and to have counsel present during the interrogation. No interrogation may take place if the suspect
wants a lawyer until counsel is supplied.
A number of courts have determined that the failure to advise
suspects of their right to con::::ult with counsel prior to interrogation
does not constitute error when the right to have counsel present
during the interrogation is made clear. 45 Presumably the right to
consult with counsel is subsumed in the general right to counsel in
most courts.
Cases in which the police warning has suggested that the right to
counsel might attach at some substantially later time have proven
far more troublesome. In the usual case the suspect is either advised that a court will appoint counsel if needed or, "We have no
way of giving you a lawyer if you cannot afford one, but one may be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." 46 As
the accused has both an absolute right to remain silent and the right
to have counsel present to assist during any interrogation to which
the suspect voluntarily consents, such a warning means only that a
suspect desiring appointed counsel cannot be interrogated until
counsel i~ available. In short, the only option that is foreclosed is
that of making an "immediate" statement with the assistance of
counsel.
However, the usual warning that refers to a future right to counsel is confusing at best and creates a substantial risk of leading a
suspect to believe that no effective right to appointed counsel exists
at the interrogation. The courts are divided completely insofar as
the propriety of admitting statements obtained after warning indicating that counsel is not immediately available. 47 Although final
interesting decision, see United States v. Cullinan, 396 F. Supp. 516 at 518 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), holding that failure to warn a suspect of his right to free counsel in the
event of indigency would be harmless if the prosecution could present adequate
proof of the suspect's ability to afford to retain counsel.
45
See United States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1974); State v. Ralls, 167
Conn. 408, 356 A.2d 147 (1974); Sands v. State, 542 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1975).
46
Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 214, 234 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1975).
47
See Wright v. North Carolina, 415 U.S. 936 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting from
denial of a petition for grant of a writ of certiorari) and cases cited therein. Notl'
that both federal and state courts are divided on this issue. See also Note, Crimi·
nal Procedure: Miranda Warning and the Right to "Instant Counsel"-A Growing Schism, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 957 (1976).
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resolution of the issue awaits future decisions, a trend towards acceptance of statements given after warnings of this kind seems to be
developing. 48 It is interesting to note that while the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure expressly
recognizes a warning that counsel will be appointed at a later time,
it does so in an unusually clear and forthright manner that should
cure most of the defects surrounding the present formulations. 49

B.

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

Perhaps the most important Miranda warning is that the suspect
"has the right to remain silent, and that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him." 50 The basic warning
itself is simple and difficult to abuse. However, a number of formulations have been used by various jurisdictions to explain the right
to remain silent. No specific phrasing seems required so long as the
right to remain silent is sufficiently communicated to the accused. 51
Occasionally police efforts to suggest that the suspect may refrain
from incriminating himself but may not remain silent, or that the
suspect may be char~ed with misprision of felony if he is not involved and remains silent, are improper and will result in suppression of any resulting statement. 52

48 See Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alas. 1973) (police officer was only telling
the truth); United States v. Rawls, 322 A.2d 903 <D.C. 1974); State v. ~.laluia, 56
Hawaii 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975); Arnold ,.. State, 548 P.2d 65!1 tUkla. 1971.iJ;
Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 234 N. W.2d 316 (1975). But see Hock\'. Statl!,
_Ark. _ , 531 S.W.2d 701 (1976) (warning valid on the facts of tht.> case but
would be invalid for indigents); People v. Buckler, 39 N. Y.2d 895, 352 N.E.2d 5S3,
386 N. Y.S.2d 396 (1976). A numbt.>r of courts have accepted statements using
these warnings but have done so with deep concern. St•c Gremlier, supra.

49

No law enforcement officer shall question an arrest<'<! p<>rson aft~r h~ has l:<~~n brou~bl lothpolice station or otherwise attempt to induce him to mak<> a •tat~m~nl unl~rs be bas t>..-.,n
advised by the station officer in plain understandable lan!(lla~:•
id that If he "',.he• l"
consult a lawyer or to have a la\\yer pres.ent dunng questicntng. but 1ti- unnblt" to obt.o:un one.-. bt"
will not be questioned until a lawyer ha• been pro,•ided for him. •uch ad\'1«' •hall a!,., 1r.du.Jc
information on how he may arrange to havE' a lawyer t'O pro\·tdt>d

ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(1Jlc) (1975).
384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966).
51 See Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 463 Pa. 375, ____ , 344 A.2d 88U, 882-82 11975!
(warning that "you have the right to refuse to answer questions asked of you while
you are in custody ... " was sufficient to convey the right to remain silent despite
the failure to use the word "statement").
52 See United States v. Williams, 2 C.M.A. 430, 9 C . .M.R. 60 (1953) Ideals with the
military's statutory analogue to Miranda); United States''· Allen, 48 C.~I.R. 474
(A.C.M.R. 1974).
50
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING
A STATEMENT

Under the Miranda formulation, an interrogator must advise his
suspect that any statement made "may be used as evidence against
him." 53 Variations of the warning have used "will," "could,"
or "might" in place of the word "may" in the warning. 54 Stating that
any comments "will be used against you" certainly provides the suspect with the strongest warning. However, it fails to take into account the possibility that the evidence might be used for the accused. Paralleling the Miranda formulation, the English Judges'
Rules provide that an interrogating constable must tell a suspect
that anything he may say "may be put into writing and given in
evidence." 55 Telling the American suspect that his statement might
be used for him may, however, be considered an improper inducement which will render a statement involuntary. 5 6

D.

OTHER WARNINGS

While Miranda set forth a number of required rights warnings,
defense counsel have frequently argued that given cases require a
number of additional warnings not specifically spelled out in the decision.
Perhaps the most common additional warning said by the defense
to be required is that the suspect who has chosen to make a statement may choose to change his mind at any time and remain silent.
While there is no doubt that the suspect may indeed .invoke the
right to remain silent at any time during interrogation, 57 Miranda
does not require that suspects be advised of that right to terminate
an interview, so long as their decision to stop talking is respected; 58
accordingly, the courts have almost unanimously denied the defense
claim that such a warning is required. 59
384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966).
See generally Kamisar supra note 21, at 570-71.
55
JUDGES' RULES, supra note 37, Rules II, III & IV.
56 See KAIIUSAR supra note 21, at 570-71 for a discussion of this issue.
7
5 384 u.s. 436, 473-74 (1966).
5 8 /d. at 444-45, 467-70, 473-74.
59
See Crowe v. State, 54 Ala. App. 121, 305 So. 2d 396 (Ct. Crim. App. 1974);
State v. Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402, 418-19, 324 A.2d 234, 244, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
861 (1973); State v. Sherwood, 139 N.J. Super. 201, 204-05, 353 A.2d 137, 139
(1976); Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 317 A.2d 241 (1974); State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 577-78, 326 A.2d 821, 836 (1975);
53
54
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Perhaps more important is the occasional defense claim that the
suspect should be notified of sufficient facts to allow him to make an
intelligent decision insofar as waiver is concerned. At a minimum,
some counsel have argued, the suspect should be told of the nature
of the offense of which he is suspected. 60 Others have argued that
surrounding circumstances should be disclosed, such as whether the
crime is a felony or misdemeanor; or whether a victim has died or
been seriously injured. If evidence indicates that the suspect has
been able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, most courts
have held that information as to either the nature of the offense or
of surrounding circumstances is not required. 61
While it seems unreasonable to require the police to give a complete briefing to a suspect prior to requesting a statement, there
would appear to be no reason not to require the police to warn a
suspect of the basic nature of the offense of which he is suspected.
Such an approach has been in use in the military since 1951 62 and
has not proven detrimental to investigation.
An additional warning that has been discussed by a number of
noted commentators 63 is the statement that the silence of an accused will not be used against him. In the light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, 64 that warning would now be legally true insofar as
admission of evidence of a warned witness' silence at trial is concerned. However, as Professors Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel point
out, 65 the accused's silence may well have detrimental effects in-

See U.C.M.J. art. 3l(b), requiring that a suspect be advised of the nature of the
offense of which he is suspected. The warning need not be overly specific or tech·
nical (e.g., "you are suspected of killing Smith" is enough). Miller v. State. __
Ind._, 335 N.E.2d 206 (1975).
61 See State v. Kenner, _
La. _ , 290 So. 2d 299 (1974) (defendant was not
entitled to be warned that he was confessing to a felony); People v. Lewis, 43 App.
Div. 2d 989, 352 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1974) (defendant was not entitled to be warned
that the rape victim had died); State v. Owen, 13 Wash. App. 146, 149, 534 P.2d
123, 125 (1975) (general nature of charges against defendant are required). But
see People v. Prude, 32 Ill. App. 3d 410, 415-17, 336 N.E.2d 348, 352-54 (1975)
(juvenile suspects should have been warned of the possibility of trial for murder in
normal adult courts); Harris v. Commonwealth, _ Va. __ , _ S.E.2d __ • 20
Crim. L. Rep. 2529 (Va. March 4, 1977) (interrogator was not required to warn
juvenile that he might be prosecuted as an adult).
62 See note 60 supra; see generally Lederer, Rights War11i11gs i11 tile .-\n11ed Srrt•·
ices, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
63 See note 56 supra.
64 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
See generally Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Testimo11y By Proof of Post·
Arrest Silence: Doyle v. Ohio, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261 (1976).
65 See note 56 supra.
60
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sofar as police decision making is concerned. Despite this, and inasmuch as most suspects feel a psychological necessity to speak (the
underlying assumption of Miranda), one would think that a warning
that the suspect's silence may not be used against him at trial would
be desirable. It would at least minimize the inherent compulsion
that Miranda deals with. However, such a warning does not appear
to be required at this time and it would seem most unlikely that the
Supreme Court would even consider extending Miranda.

VII. WHEN ARE MIRANDA
WARNINGS REQUIRED?
For purposes of analysis the Miranda rule may be stated thusly:
Warnings are required whenever a law enforcement agent subjects
a suspect to custodial interrogation. The key terms are law enforcement agent, suspect, and custodial interrogation. It is critically important, however, to keep in mind that Miranda by definition applies only to those forms of communication protected by the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, a
number of actions that would appear to be "incriminating'' in terms
of consequence are not within Miranda's ambit. Examples of unprotected actions include the taking of handwriting and voice exemplars, 66 bodily fluids, 67 and obtaining consent to search. 68 Similarly,
compelled psychiatric examinations normally will not require
Miranda warnings. 69 For analytical purposes, these unprotected actions can best be viewed as not coming within the definition of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes. 70
66
See People v. Henderson,_ Mich. App. _ , _ , 245 N.W. 2d 72, 74 (1974)
(Miranda warnings held unnecessary when obtaining voice samples, as voice
exemplars are unprotected by the fifth amendment).
67
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1967) (bodily fluids not protected by the
right against self-incrimination).
68
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Miranda warnings or warning
of the right to refuse to give consent are not required for a valid consent search).
69
At present the majority rule is that an accused intending to raise a defense of
insanity can be compelled to submit to a government psychiatric examination. The
defendant in such a case is said to have impliedly waived his privilege to the extent necessary to allow the examination and to allow the examining psychiatrist to
testify at trial as to his conclusions. Miranda warnings are thus inappropriate.
For a reappraisal of this view, see Comment, Miranda on the Couch: An Approach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel, and Miranda Warnings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants, 11 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 403 (1975).
70
Note that matters protected by the privilege may still escape Miranda because
of other circumstances. See State v. Gwaltney,_ N.C. App. _ , 228 S.E.2d 764
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WHO MUST GNE MIRANDA WARNINGS?

The Miranda warnings were designed to offset the psychological
coercion assumed to be inherent in custodial questioning by law enforcement agents. 71 Generally, the cases have required police officers, prosecutors, and law enforcement agents with ofticial status to
give warnings, 72 and exempted private citizens from the warning
requirements. 73 Part-time police and private security guards pose
some difficulty. The primary question appears to be the existence of
status as a local, state or federal officer. 74 Thus, cases involving
private guards will frequently require a determination of the
guard's arrest powers under local law. As one commentator has
stated, 75 the private citizen exception to Miranda will generally not
apply to citizens acting as police agents. 76 While police officers must
give warnings before conducting custodial interrogations, under(1976) (accident report questions did not require Mira11da warningt> because the
questions were investigatory rather than accusatory and thus were not within the
scope of Miranda).
71 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966).
72 See generally, J. ZAGEL, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS AFTER ~IIRANDA:
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDELINE OF THE LAW 46-47 (1972).
73 See, e.g., Reno v. State,_ Ala. App. __ , 337 So.2d 122 (Ct. Crim. App. Hl76)
(company officer); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, ___ Mass. ___ , 335 N.E.2d 660
(1974) (vigilante group of private citizens were not required to give warnings to
suspect subjected to custodial interrogation); Brown v. State, ___ ~liss. ___ , 293
So.2d 425 (1974) (jail cell questioning by victim's mother did not require .\liranda
warnings when the conversation was not instigated by the police).
74
0fficial status or a significant police connection will require warnings. Compare
Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alas. 1973) (private arson investigator who was a
former police officer and who worked closely with the police and considered himself part of the "team" was required to give warnings); and Allen \". State, 52 Ala.
App. 66, 297 So.2d 391 (Ala. Crim. App.), c-ert. denied, 292 Ala. 707, 297 So.2d
399 (1974) (interrogator who had occasionally acted as a part-time deputy sheriff
in the past had sufficient connections with the sheriff that warnings should have
been given) with United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974) !although
interrogating newsman had acted as a part-time unpaid deputy sheriff, hit> past
activities had been restricted to acting as a photographer, press secretary, or
helping to search for drowning victims; accordingly, he was not a law enforcement
agent for Miranda purposes).
75
J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at-·
76 Citizens acting as police agents may have to give warnings. Compare People v.
Baugh, 19 Ill. App. 3d 448, 311 N.E.2d 607 (1975) (victim's attorney who questioned suspect in police custody was acting as a police agent and he should have
given .Miranda warnings) with State v. Jensen, 11 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975)
(prisoners who obtained a statement from cellmate were not "plants" and could
testify to statements made by the accused). Note that a person investigating misconduct who is not a law enforcement agent may not have to give warnings despite
holding an official position. See In re Brendan H .• 82 Misc. 2d 1977,372 N.Y.S.2d
473 (Schenectady Fam. Ct. 1975) (school principal investigating school misconduct
not required to give warnings to students in the absence of police connection).
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cover agents are usually exempted from the warning requirement
simply because u11dercover work normally does not involve C'ltstodial interrogation. 7 7
There are, of course, a number of persons likely to question a
suspect as part of the law enforcement process who are not themselves law enforcement agents. Cases involving clerical personnel
should be analyzed in terms of the status of the clerk, the purpose of
the questioning, and the general policies served by Miranda. Government psychiatrists performing competency examinations, particularly examinations in response to sanity defenses, should
theoretically present a problem, as the information gained from the
suspect may well be used against him. However, inasmuch as the
courts have nearly unanimously held that a suspect raising a sanity
defense must consent to a government examination, 78 there would
If one were to be concerned only with questions of fairness there would appelll'
to be some question why undercover agents should be allowed to question suspects
without warnings when uniformed officers would be prevented from doing so.
However, this avoids the rationale for Miranda. Undercover agents questioning
suspects in a noncustodial setting by definition do not create the type of coercive
atmosphere found in a police station.
78 There has been general implicit acceptance that compelled psychiatric examinntion of this kind, usually on pain of preventing the defense from presenting all or
part of its evidence on sanity, involves the types of coercion that allows the
privilege to be invoked. However, the courts have distinguished the situation
from the usual attempt to obtain incriminating testimony by concentrating on the
intent and justification behind the examination. The overwhelming majority rule
in the United States today is that when a defendant intends to raise a sanity defense he has impliedly waived in part his privilege against self-incrimination. Sec
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c); United States v. Jines, No. 76-1102 (8th Cir. filed 1976);
United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526
F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Barrera, 486 F.2d 333, 338-39 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974); United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234,
1236 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Babbidge, 18
C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969); Lewis v. Thulemeyer, 538 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1975);
Noyes v. State, 516 P.2d 1368 (Okla. 1973). But see United States v. Alvarez, 519
F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Aronson, Should the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 55 (1973); Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination?
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUT. L. REV. 489 (1965); Lede1·er,
Rights Warnings in the Military, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Requiring a
Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648
(1970). Under the decisions, the defendant must submit to a government psychintrist (who need not give Miranda warnings) but who will not be allowed to testify
at trial to any specific incriminating remarks made during the interview and must
limit himself to his conclusions on the issue of sanity. See United States v. Bohle,
445 F .2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1967). Note that Virginia allows a coerced examination as long as the defendant is not forced to answer questions regarding the of77
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appear to be no reason for warnings to be given. 79
Foreign police have not been required to give Miranda warnings 80 when interrogating an American suspect if only because the
United States cannot compel foreign jurisdictions to comply with
American law. Clearly the prophylactic function served by Mimnda
domestically is irrelevant in foreign jurisdications with their own
legal rules. This is not, however, to suggest that Mimnda should
not apply to foreign investigations which are conducted in conjunction with American authorities and are simply part and parcel of an
American investigation. 81 American efforts to circumvent the
Miranda requirements are to be discouraged. However, this approach creates a substantial risk of deterring American prosecution
and leaving the American accused in the hands of foreign authorities. The balance is yet to be struck.

B.

SUSPECT

While it is possible to have a custodial interrogation of a person
who is not a suspect, 82 by the very nature of American law the
number of custodial interrogations of nonsuspects will be extremely
low. After all, if a person is not a suspect, what justification will the

fense with which he is charged. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d
845 (1975). Refusal by the defendant to submit may result in an adverse inference.
preclusion of the use of defense expert witnesses. preclusion of the entire sanity
defense, or perhaps even contempt. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), paras. 122(b) (2); 140(a) (2); 150(b), as ameuded by Exec.
Order No. 11,835, 40 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1975), reprinted as Change 1, ~~C~I 1969
(Rev.).
79 \Vhere no right to remain silent exists there can be no reason for warning of its
existence. However, the right to counsel at psychiatric examinations is not totally
foreclosed and in those few jurisdictions recognizing a limited right to counsel
some form of rights warning would seem appropriate.
80 See United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 907 OOth Cir. 1974) <Miranda warnings were not required in Peruvian investigation despite American participation in
absence of American officers playing a "substantial role in events leading to the
arrest").
81 See Cranford v. Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975) (Mexican police acting
on behalf of New Mexico police should have given Miranda warnings).
82A person in custody for one offense might be questioned merely as a witness to a
second. Assuming that the questions relating to the second offense could not in
any way touch on the first, a rather abstract and unlikely situation in \'iew of the
possibility of derivative evidence and the use of any information gained for impeachment and related uses, by implication Miranda would not appear to apply,
as its purpose was to protect suspects from questioning. Note that the .fact of
custody is the determining feature for a suspect. Ih is unimportant that he is in
custody for another offense so long as he is a supect. See Mathis\'. United States,
391 u.s. 1 (1968).
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authorities have to hold him in custody? Thus, normally, and in contrast to the statutory warning requirements 83 of military criminal
law, the threshold question will often be whether the person questioned was in custody and not whether he was a suspect. The cases
frequently exhibit in this regard an ambiguous use of the word
"focus." While courts often attempt to determine if an investigation
has "focused" on an individual to determine whether he was in custody at the time of questioning, the same question is also asked to
determine whether the person questioned was truly a suspect at the
time of interrogation. The two separate criteria for Mimnda application are thus frequently merged, and careful analysis may be
needed to distinguish a court's true holding.

C.

CUSTODY

Miranda's use of the expression "custodial interrogation" is deceptively simplistic. The case defines it as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 84 The problems engendered by this formulation can be
grouped into two areas-the test to be applied in defining custody,
and the determination of the presence of custody once a test has
been arrived at.
The difficulty in arriving at a test is caused by Miranda's basic
premise. If the warnings are to cope with psychological coercion felt
by the suspect, the test at least arguably should be a subjective one
that seeks to determine whether the suspect believed himself to be
in custody. While such an approach may most fully implement
Miranda's apparent intent, it may unreasonably open the door to
perjury by the defendant. Similarly, the test makes determinative
the suspect's perhaps unreasonable view of the situation. While
there is much to be said for requiring warnings whenever a doubtful
situation may exist, it was clearly not the intent of the Court in
Miranda to foreclose all police questioning without warnings; and
this could easily be the result of a purely subjective test.
An alternative test that was chosen by some jurisdictions after
83

The statutory military rights warnings, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1970), apply, for
example, whenever a suspect or accused is to be questioned without any requirement that the individual be in custody. Determination of whether a person was in
fact a suspect becomes in the military a question of fact.
84
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Note that in the deleted footnote which follows the
quote, the Court stated, "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an
investigation which had focused on an accused."
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Miranda was that of the police o[{ice1·'s view of the 8ituation. 85 Thi8

subjective test eliminated unreasonable perceptions of the accused
but substituted the perhaps unreasonable view of the police officer.
If the purely subjective tests are to be discarded, one is left with
variations on an objective test. Two major variants seem possible:
whether the defendant was in fact in custody-a purely objectiv~
test; 86 and, bearing in mind the accused's age, intellect, experience,
physical condition, and so forth, whether he reasonably believed
that he was in fact in custody_B? This latter version has the advantage of taking into account the very factors that Miranda and its
predecessors considered important.
The extent to which a jurisdiction may utilize any specific test i8
difficult to determine because of the necessity for a case-by-case approach and because of a tendency to use ambiguous language in decisions. A plurality of American jurisdictions seemingly using a
single test appear to employ one or another type of objective standard to determine the presence of custody.
Many jurisdictions choose to use what they characterize a8 a
"focus" test. 88 Deriving its origins from Escobedo t~. Illinois, 89 this
test in its purest sense (one seldom applied) attempts to determine
whether the individual questioned was in fact the "focus" or central
point of the investigation. The focus test, as a definitional test for
85 This test led to the question of the interrogating officer: "Would you have lf.'llhl'
defendant leave?" No jurisdiction uses this test alone today.
86 See J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alas. 1975); State v. Thomas, 22 N.l'. App.
206, 206 S.E.2d 390 (1974).
87
0r as often expressed-reasonably believe that he was free to leave. United
States v. Luther, 521 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1975). See State v. l\layes, llO Ariz. 318,
518 P.2d 568 (1974); People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, l16 Cal. Rptr. 641,
_ P.2d _ (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Parada, ___ Col. _., 533 P.2d
1121 (1975); State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976); /11 re Brendan H., 82 ~lise.
2d 1077,372 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Fam. Ct. 1975); Commonwealth v. Fit-1her, _ . Pa. _ .
352 A.2d 26 (1976) (note that Pennsylvania uses both an objective test and the
subjective view of the suspect, the positive results of either resulting in custody;
see Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713 (1974)); Jordan \'. Com·
monwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E. 2d 573 (1976).
88 See Moore v. State, 54 Ala. App. 22, 304 So. 2d 263 (('rim. App. 1974); Reeves
v. State,_ Ark._, 528 S.W.2d 924 (1975); People v. Dunn, 31111. App. 3d 854,
334 N .E.2d 866 (1975); State v. Carson, 216 Kan. 711, 533 P .2d 1342 11975); State
v. Ned,_ La._, 236 So.2d 477 (1976); People v. Langley, 63 !llich. App. 3:l9,
234 N.W.2d 513 (1975); State v. Raymond,_ Minn. __ , 232 N.W.2d 879 (1975);
State v. Simpson,_ Utah 2d _ , 541 P.2d 1114 (1975).
89 See note 84 supra. It seems likely that the Supreme Court was attempting
through Miranda's footnote 4 to bring Escobedo into line with .Uiranda. While it
may be possible to do so, the attempt is difficult at bet-1t and Mircnzda is better
viewed as having created a new test for when warnings are required.
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custody, has apparently been disavowed by the Supreme Court. 90
Cleansed, however, of its confusion with custody, focus remains a
viable test to determine whether a person questioned was in fact a
suspect, 91 and it may well be that use of the term that explains the
frequent reference to focus in many of the opinions.
Following focus in popularity, is the variety-of-factors
approach. 92 Perhaps best characterized by the fifth circuit's formulation, this test seeks to determine custody through a four-part approach: whether the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect;
whether it was the officer's intent to hold the suspect in custody;
whether the suspect believed that he was not free to leave; whether
the investigation had focused on the suspect. 93 This approach allows
the court to handle on an individual basis each case in which a formal arrest is lacking. While phrased in many fashions, many opinions in this area appear to follow a multi-factor approach leading to
the distinct possibility that no majority rule exists in the nation
today insofar as a specific definitional test for custody is concerned.
Regardless of the test adopted, the court in any specific case must
determine whether the interrogated defendant was in custody. This
is without question a matter totally dependent upon the facts of the
case. Factors which have been considered important in this determination include the place of interrogation; 94 when the questioning
90

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). In Beckwith, a case involving
the failure of IRS special agents to give warnings to the suspect whom they interviewed in a private home, the Court did concede the possiblity that "noncustodial
interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, be characterized as one where the 'behavior of ... law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions
not freely self-determined.'" 425 U.S. at 347-48 (citation omitted). While the failure to give warnings in such a case would be relevant, it would not be fatal. Ser
also United States v.Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1975).
91
See Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973) (questioning of family member whose relatives had died in an arson related fire were not part of nn
investigation which had focused on him); State v. Martin, 277 Minn. 470,212 N.W.
2d 847 (1973) (police simply wanted to know why defendant was in vacant apartment); State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973) (sheriff asked prisoner what had happened to fellow prisoner lying in a pool of blood; incriminatory
answer came from nonsuspect (no focus)).
92 See Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308 (1976); State v. Kalai, 56 Hawaii
366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975); State v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975);
State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168,329 A.2d 75 (App. Div.), affd, 67 N.J. 267,
337 A.2d 371 (1974); State v. Gill, 24 Ore. App. 541, 546 P.2d 786 (1976); Ancira v.
State, 516 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1974).
93 See United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1975); B1·own v. Beto, 468
F .2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972).
94
While a custodial interrogation may take place in the suspect's home, see Orozco
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took place; 95 persons present, and the existence or absence of a
formal arrest; 96 use of weapons or other physical restraint; whether
the interview was initiated by the suspect or police; 97 whether the
suspect attended the interview voluntarily; 98 whether the suspect
was or felt free to leave the interrogation, and the length and nature of the interrogation itself. The mere fact that a person has been
questioned by the police does not in and of itself create a custodial
interrogation. 99 Accordingly, all the factors listed above may be relevant in determining whether custody existed for Jfh·a nda
purposes.
The language of Miranda in speaking of any "sign{{icant" interference with the suspect's freedom of action is the key to the determination of custody. When the suspect has been formally arrested
and brought to the police station house the determination is usually
simple. Generally, it is only when the defendant has been questioned without an arrest, and usually outside the station house, that
the numerous factors discussed above become critical. 100

D. INTERROGATION-THE HEART OF lv!IRANDA
The Miranda warnings are designed to protect against coercive
interrogation. The meaning of "interrogation" has tended, however,
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Commonwealth v. Borodine, ___ .Mass. ___ , :353
N.E.2d 649 (1976), such a location is very likely to weigh heavily in a finding of no
custody. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973). See Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Roberts v. State, __ Miss. ___ , 301 So.2d
859 (1974) (suspect's front yard); State v. Starkey, 536 S.W. 2d 8.58 (~to. App.
1976) (suspect's home).
95
See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713 0974).
96
The Supreme Court has found the lack of a formal arrest to be of great-perhaps
determinative-significance in a case involving the "voluntary" interrogation of a
parolee. Oregon v. Mathiason,_ U.S. __ , 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (finding ,\lira11da
inapplicable). The Court's opinion suggests that the future may see .\lira11da lim·
ited to formal arrest situations that involve station house interrogations.
91
See United States v. Victor Standing Soldier, ___ F.2d __ (8th Cir. 1976).
98
See People v. Wipfler, 37 IlL App. 3d 400, 346 N.E.2d 41 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Simpson,_ Mass._, _ , 345 N.E.2d 899, 904 0976). This factor is by no
means conclusive. See State v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976) lvolun·
tary attendance overcome by coercive environment and circum!ltances).
99
For example, a recognized "exception" to Miranda exists for "general inves·
tigative questioning," a police officer's general questions at the scene of the of·
fense. Despite the term "exception," frequently these cases are ones in which a
suspect does not yet exist (the investigation has not yet "focused" on someone) or
the individuals questioned are not in custody. See State v. Kalai, 56 Hawaii. 366,
537 P.2d 8 (1975); People v. Langley, 63 Mich. App. 339, 234 N. W.2d 513 (1975);
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 0976).
100
See generally J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at 12-36, for a complete list of factors
with accompanying citation.
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to become a term of art and defies easy definition. In its usual
sense, interrogation for Miranda purposes refers to police questioning designed to elicit a response from a suspect. More than simple
questioning is included, however. Any statement or action designed
to elicit an incriminating response will be considered interrogation.101 Whether a statement or physical act will indeed be considered interrogation will be determined on the facts of each individual
case. 102
Clearly exempted from Miranda's definition of interrogation,
however, are volunteered or spontaneous statements. 103 If a suspect should initiate a statement or should respond to entirely neutral or innocuous questioning or statements with an incriminating
comment, the comment is admissible io 4 and the police need not

0

101 See Blackmon v. Blackledge, 396 F. Supp. 296, 299 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (confronting defendant suddenly after four hours of police interrogation with witness who
accused him of murder was a form of interrogation requiring warnings). Some
courts have held confrontations not to be interrogations.
102
Police statements or actions are likely to be found to be noninterrogative. See
United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976) (police remark to suspect
that a search warrant would be applied for after arrest was not an interrogation,
and suspect's subsequent admission and surrender of evidence was not in violation
of Miranda); United States v. Martin, 511 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1975) (police comment to defendant during search that they had arrived a day or so late to search
was not an interrogation and the defendant's resulting admission was acceptable
in evidence); People v. Mangum,_ Colo. _ , 539 P.2d 120 (1975) (police statement to suspect that electronic equipment had had its serial number obliterated
was not interrogation just as officer's greeting of the suspect was not); State v.
Burton, 22 N.C. App. 559, 207 S.E.2d 344 (1974) (officer's act of handing white hat
discovered at the scene of the crime to the defendant at the police station was not
interrogation; defendant's acknowledgement of ownership did not violate
Miranda). But see People v. Paulin, 61 Misc. 2d 289, 305 N. Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct.),
affd, 33 App. Div. 2d 105, 308 N.Y.S.2d 883, affd, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d
164, 366 N. Y.S.2d 929 (1969) (police statements concerning victim's death hold to
be interrogation). See also Brewer v. Williams,_ U.S._, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287
(1977) (police transporting murder defendant emphasized to him the terrible
weather and the fact that his victim's body was abandoned in it without Christian
burial; the Court found this to be interrogation).
1 <m384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). See Garcia v. State,_ Ind. App. 2d _ , 304 N.E.2d
812 (1973) (statement by rape suspect: "It wasn't rape, it was assault with a
friendly weapon" was admissible without warnings); State v. Hobson, __ Minn.
_ , 244 N.W.2d 654 (1976) (defendant refused to leave the police station without
"his" gun; volunteered statement held admissible to establish possession of stolen
weapon); Commonwealth v. Boone, _ Pa. _ , 354 A.2d 898 (1975) (defendant
asked policeman if he had heard what had happened; after his negative reply he
told defendant they were going to the homicide division; she then admitted stabbing); State v. Valez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) (as officer began to read
the warnings to the defendant he volunteered: "You don't have to ask, I shot
her."). See generally J. ZAGEL, supra note 72 at 37-40.
104
See People v. Potter, 20 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1054-55, 314 N.E.2d 201, 205 (1974)
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inten-upt the statement with Mi1·anda warnings. 105 Further it appears probable, although the issue has not yet been finally resolved,
that once a spontaneous statement begins the police may seek to
have it continue or to flesh it out with neutral questioning.
The spontaneous statement exception to Mi1·anda is difficult
theoretically. 106 If Miranda presumes that the psychological coercion of custody requires an offsetting warning, the same coercive
atmosphere would seem to compel a suspect to make volunteered
statements to seek police approval. Removing volunteered statements from Miranda's coverage is thus inconsistent with its basic
rationale. 107 However, the exception appears to be too well accepted to be modified at this stage.
Miranda and its related cases 108 dealt primarily with station
house interrogations or their equivalent. Thus, the extent to which
its comparatively broad holding involving custodial interrogations
involved non-station-house questioning was unclear. It is now apparent that questioning a suspect in police custody will generally
trigger the warning requirements regardless of the location of the
questioning. However, a number of types of street encounter are
not covered by Miranda.
Miranda expressly recognized the need for police investigation:
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime
or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is
not affected by our holding." 109 The authors of the opinion seem to
(deputy sheriff attempted to quiet a prisoner and had a neutral conversation with
him; prisoner's volunteered statement that "he was going to con them like a snake
and charm his way out ... "was not obtained in violation of .\firanda). Note that
the nature of the statement made to the suspect will be of critical importance in
determining whether it constitutes interrogation. See notes 101 & 102 supra.
1°5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
106 See United States v. Pauldino, 487 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1973) (polic£' request for
bill of sale for vehicle was proper after arrested suspect volunteered the stat£'·
ment that he had a bill of sale for the vehicle); United States v. Vogel, 18 C.~LA.
160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1968). Whether questions are sufficiently n£'utral or have b£'come improper interrogation must be determined from the individual facts of each
case. State v. Taylor, 343 A.2d 11 (Me. 1975) (policeman's question, "What do you
mean?'' held to be a neutral question following defendant's initiated statement,
and reply was not in violation of Miranda); Commonwealth v. Yount, __ Pa.
_,
314 A.2d 242 (1974) (defendant entered police station and announced that the
police were looking for him; police questioning to determine why, and sub·
sequently who had been his homicide victim, was proper).
107
Miranda resolves the conflict by defining volunteered statements as those
made "voluntarily without any compelling influences." 384 U.S. at 478. Query.
whether this statement applies to a volunteered admission made after station
house detention?
108
See note 17 supra.
1°9 384 U.S. at 477-78.
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have envisaged a general investigation which lacked an identifiable
suspect. The numerous cases in this area seem to break down into
three major groups: those in which a known suspect did not exist at
the time of questioning (e.g., the investigation had not yet "focused" on the individual questioned or perhaps a violation of law
was not yet clear); 110 those in which a suspect may have been
known, but custody was lacking; 111 and those in which both a suspect and custody existed but police questioning was held to have
been general investigation and not within the Miranda definition of
interrogation. 112
While there is some reason to doubt the propriety of the lastmentioned group of cases, the Supreme Court has in the years since
Miranda evinced a hostility both to the case itself and to its application outside the station house. 113 Accordingly, this limit on
Miranda's scope may not be appropriate despite some question as to
Miranda's original meaning.
Similar to this last group of cases are the cases in which a suspect
has been surprised in the commission of an offense by the police and
is questioned, usually after he is taken into custody. A number of
courts have approved questioning without warnings in such a situation, reasoning that Miranda was never meant to apply to on-thescene questioning. Presumably the courts involved believe that the
coercive atmosphere of the station house is lacking in such circum110 See District of Columbia v. M.E.H., 312 A.2d 561 (D.C. App. 1973) (question of
who owned the gun was addressed to the group, not to a given person); State v.
Egger, 24 Ore. App. 927, 547 P.2d 643 (1976) (vehicle stop for erratic driving).
But see People v. Norwood,_ Mich. App. _ , 243 N.W.2d 719 (1976) (holding
that sheriffs question, "What Happened?" to defendant who had summoned him
to her home because she had shot the deceased was a violation of Miranda); cf.
People v. Greer, 49 App. Div. 297, 374 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1975). Some courts have
held Miranda inapplicable to stopping and frisking under much the same reasoning. See People v. Myles,_ Cal. App. 3d_, 123 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975); Crum v.
State, 281 So.2d 368 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973). See also note 100 supra.
111 See State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 643, _ , 235 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1975) (vehicle registration check led to officer's noting marihuana seeds; questioning prior
to formal arrest didn't require warnings); cf. Gedicks v. State, 62 Wis. 74, 214
N. W.2d 569 (1974) (defendant's I. D. checked by policeman to determine his reason
to be on university grounds).
112 See Owens v. United States, 340 A.2d 821 (D.C. App. 1975) (burglar was
caught at the scene and handcuffed; his incriminating reply (made one or two seconds after the apprehension) to policeman's question of what he was doing on the
roof was admissible as warnings were not required); State v. Henson, ___ Ore.
App. _ , 541 P.2d 1085 (1975) (vehicle stop resulted in questioning about a hit
and run; Miranda warnings held not to have been required despite fact that officer removed defendant's car keys and directed him to remain in the vehicle).
113 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973).
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stances.U 4 Additionally, a number of decisions have mentioned the
possibility that the suspect is in fact innocent and simply found in
incriminating circumstances which can be cleared up quickly
through limited police questioning. The propriety of such reasoning
is questionable considering Mimnda's intent.
There is general agreement that law enforcement officers may ask
questions of suspects without Miranda warnings when the questions are motivated by safety considerations. 115 "While life hangs in
the balance, there is no room to require admonitions concerning the
right to counsel and to remain silent. It is inconceivable that the
Miranda court or the framers of the Constitution envisioned such
admonishments first be given under [the urgent circumstances involved]." 116 While presumably the suspects in these cases retain
their right to remain silent, the cases suggest that safety overcomes
the Miranda rationale which dealt with a lesser priority.
A large number of courts have held that traffic offenses constitute
an exception to Miranda. 117 Generally, such stops will be noncustodial in any event. However, the rationale for excluding traffic stops
seems to be that they are common events that are to be expected by
most citizens; that the usual traffic violation is not the sort of crime
Miranda dealt with; and that traffic questioning fits the general investigatory exception to Mimnda. 118 While this may be appropriate
for simple driving violations, the same rule has occasionally been
applied to drunken driving and more serious offenses. 119 These
cases tend to blend into those which hold that Miranda is inapplicable to misdemeanors. 120 In view of the substantial punishments
See United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1973).
See United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) lt!n band <FBI
agent participating in a gambling raid asked the defendant whetht?r he had any
weapons; the resulting seizure of illegal weapons was not in violation of .\limmlu J;
Norman v. State, 302 So.2d 254, 258 <Miss. 1974) (questions to group which had
fired at the police were motivated by safety and were not inqui:;itorial intt!rroga·
tion).
116 People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 2d 875, 882, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (19741.
117 See Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant questiont!d aftt?r
arrest for drunken driving during which he threatened police officers with a gun;
Miranda held inapplicable); State v. Bowen, 336 A.2d 228 !Del. Supl'r. 197:>J
(Miranda held inapplicable to motor vehicle cases); State \'. C'upp, 3G Ohio App.
2d 224, 304 N.E.2d 598 (1973) (Miranda inapplicable to questions accompanying
arrest for drunken driving). But see State v. Lawson, 285 N.C.2d 320, 204 S.E.2d
843 (1974) (Miranda held applicable to traffic violations).
118 Cf. J. ZAGEL, supra note 72 at 34-35.
119 See note 117 supra.
120 See State v. Glanton, _Iowa_, 231 N. W.2d 31 (1974); State v. Gabrielson,
_Iowa-· 192 N. W.2d 792 (1971); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d
826 (1969).
114

115
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for such offenses, one must question the legitimacy of limiting
Miranda in such a fashion. If Miranda itself is correctly decided,
how can a court accept improperly obtained statements just because
the maximum sentence involved will be "no more" than a year in
jail?
Any arrest requires a formal processing of the defendant, usually
known as "booking." Whether through formal booking or other administrative questioning, information is occasionally obtained which
is incriminating and which proves harmful to the accused at trial. 121
Four of five federal circuit courts of appeal that had considered the
issue by the close of 1976 had held Miranda inapplicable to preliminary or administrative questions. 122 The rationale involved appears
to be that the data is normally nonincriminating, is essential to an
efficient criminal justice process, and constitutes noninvestigative
questioning.
As suggested by one commentator, 123 there is limited Supreme
Court authority to support this view. In California v. Bye1·s, 124 the
Court upheld a state reporting system which required drivers involved in accidents to stop and leave names and addresses. Clearly
the Court found a limited infringement on the driver's privilege
against self-incrimination to be appropriate. 125 The same reasoning
121 See United States eJ.' rei. Hines v. LaVelle, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975) (information gained through informal police administrative questioning while defendant was being transported to the station house proved important in identifying suspect as rapist).
122 The Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
held such questioning to be proper without warnings while the District of Columbia Circuit has allowed questioning but rejected its results from use in evidence nt
trial. Note, The Applicability of Miranda to the Police Booking Process, 1976
DUKE L.J. 574, 576 (1976), and cases cited therein.
123 I d. at 585-86.
1 24 402 u.s. 424 (1971).
125 In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court considered California's
hit and run statute which required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
to stop at the scene and to leave his name and address. Byers claimed that his
conviction for failure to do so after an accident violated his privilege against selfincrimination. Reversing the Supreme Court of California, the Court upheld the
state statute, finding that it did not involve "a highly selective group inhl'rently
suspect of criminal activities," and did not apply only in an area "permeated with
criminal statutes." ld. at 430. Leaving name and address was found to be an essentially neutral act even though it might supply a link in the evidentiary chnin.
!d. at 434.
While the majority opinion, consisting of a plurality and a concurrence in the
judgment by Mr. Justice Harlan, found that the privilege was inapplicable, the
dissent stated that, contrary to the Court's holding, the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident was so likely to have violated a criminal statute thnt thl'
Court's holding could not in truth be distinguished from its previous cases. This
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may be applicable here. On the other hand, Bye1·s dealt with a situation believed to be inherently noncriminal. While the preliminary
information supplied during the booking process should normally be
nonincriminating, it is part and parcel of the criminal justice process
and is like either to yield incriminating information directly, or to
supply leads to the prosecution. It may be that the proper compromise is to allow the questioning but to immunize the defendant
from any use of the information gained through it.
The Supreme Court has expressly held Miranda inapplicable to
grand jury proceedings in United States t'. Mandu}ano. 126 The
Court stated that Miranda's concern was with custodial interrogation and "simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogation as equivalents." 127 The Court also stated that the right
against self-incrimination at a grand jury was somewhat more limited for a witness than the privilege available to an accused being
questioned by the police, that no right to counsel existed at grand
juries, and that accordingly the Mimnda warnings would be inappropriate.128 By implication, general custom, and in the military by
appears in part to be true. However, in Byers, the act of reporting was not llecessarily incriminating, while prior reporting requirements that were overturned
were almost equivalent to conviction. The Court actually utilized a balancing test,
attempting to balance the rights of the individual with thl' rights of society, i.e.,
Tension between the State's demands for disclosures and the prote<UQn of

th~ rl~:ht

self·incrimination is likely to give ris(> to st>rious questions. lnP\'itnbly tht'Stt

mUISt

b<(t

ogaln.>t

r't'roh·~:d

in terms of balancing the publio need on the one hand, and the lndi\•hlu>l claim tu ~MUlUU•mal
proteotions on the other ....

Note also the Court's approach in fourth amendment cases, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). It seems clear that in the case of reporting
requirements, the individual's rights have been limited and that, so long as a
proper purpose is involved and the result of the report is not inherently incriminating, the requirement will be upheld. As Byers indicates, the probability
of incrimination is relevant. The Government may not avoid the problem by using
forfeiture proceedings rather than a criminal prosecution, United States v. U.S.
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971), although civil tax proceedings are
possible. But compare Widdis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 1015 <D. Alas. 1974),
with Jensen v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 116 (Colo. 1972). The alternati\'e is
to find that the privilege is applicable but that, to sustain the reporting requirement, neither the information divulged nor derivative information can be used as a
prosecution. The Court in Byers rejected this alternative, finding that it would
place an insurmountable burden on the prosecution. Following Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Byers, the Virginia Supreme Court has sustained a state reporting
requirement, despite a real threat of self-incrimination, because of an overriding
state interest. Banks v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 527, 230 S.E.2d 256 (1976).
126
425 U.S. 564 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Columbia Im·estment Corp.,
457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974).
127
425 U.S. at 579.
128 I d. at 579-80.
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statutory design, 129 there is no necessity for a trial judge to stop a
witness at trial who may incriminate himself and to warn him of his
right to remain silent. It is important to note that although there is
no legal duty to warn a witness of his right against selfincrimination at a grand jury proceeding or trial, warnings may be
given. 130
By its very nature Miranda was intended to deal with criminal
interrogations. Its purpose was to give meaning to the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. By definition, an administrative consequence cannot be criminal. Accordingly, interrogations
which cannot result in criminal prosecutions are not interrogations
within the scope of Miranda. The dividing line between criminal
and adminstrative consequence is thin at times, 131 and it can be difficult in the absence of judicial decision to predict Miranda's
applicability.
129 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.) para.
140a(2), stating that a judge need not warn a witness at trial of his right to remain
silent but that he may do so.
130 See United States v. Jacobs, No. 75-1319 (2d Cir. filed Dec. 30, 1976), suppressing the grand jury testimony of a perjury defendant for failure to warn her
during the proceedings that she was a "target" of the investigation. In reaching
its decision, the court exercised its supervisory powers while concurring in the
Supreme Court's decision in Mandujano. The Court noted that it had been the
practice within its circuit for twenty years for United States Attorneys to warn
putative defendants of their status; the failure of a strike force prosecutor in the
circuit to do so resulted, in the court's opinion, in unequal protection of the law
and required suppression to enforce conformity within the circuit. Despite Jacobs,
the Supreme Court has held, as a matter of constitutional law, that even putative
defendants need not be warned of their right to remain silent. United States v.
Wong, 45 U.S.L.W. 4464 (U.S. 1977) (No.74-635). The Court's decision may ultimately prove of little consequence as increasing support appears to exist for legislation that would grant witnesses the right to counsel when appearing before a
grand jury. See ABA SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5
(Winter 1977).
131 Incrimination may refer to a consequence of an act (such as a criminal conviction), or to an act (a testimonial utterance) leading to a consequence.
The clearest form of incrimination is a judicially imposed criminal conviction.
The extent to which consequences other than a criminal conviction may constitute incrimination is unclear. In the past the Supreme Court has tended to look at
the actual consequence of a proceeding and its intent, rather than at its label, to
define incrimination. Thus, juvenile proceedings were generally found to be "criminal." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). However, the Court may be retreating.
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court allowed prison officials
to draw an inference of guilt from the silence of Palmigiano in a prison discipline
proceeding. As the Court found that the State of Rhode Island had not attempted
to make use of his silence at a criminal proceeding distinct from the disciplinary
proceeding, it found that the adverse inference was justifiable. Since Palmigiano
was "sentenced" to thirty days in punitive segregation and a downgrading in classification, somewhat obviously the Court found the consequence of restricted lib-
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This has been particularly true with Internal Revenue Service investigations. The transition between administrative tax investigation and criminal tax evasion investigation is difficult to pinpoint,
despite the IRS use of intelligence division agents for tax evasion
erty not to be the equivalent of "incrimination." The Court appears to be looking
at the social purpose served by the proceeding rather than either its label or con·
sequence. Thus, a form of increased deprivation of liberty becomes noncriminal.
The case is more than a little surprising because at the time of his hearing Pal·
migiano had not been granted immunity and could have been prosecuted. Pal·
migiano's offense was "inciting a disturbance and disruption of prison operations,
which might have resulted in a riot." 425 U.S. at 312. Thus the possibility of later
proceedings would seem to have been real and substantial. Despite this the Court
simply found that proceedings had not in fact taken place, making the case a
strange and perhaps important anomaly, for in the past the question had been one
of possibility and not of hindsight. The Court did note that Palmigiano's silence
was only one piece of evidence considered at the hearing, implying that a disposition based only on his silence might be improper.
In a case even more disturbing than Ba:rter v. Palmigia!lo, the Supreme Court
found military summary courts-martial, which can impose a sentence of thirty
days confinement at hard labor, to be similar to parole revocation hearings and not
criminal convictions requiring counsel for the accused. Middendorf''· Henry, 425
U.S. 25 (1976). Clearly the Court is not troubling itself over a mere deprivation of
liberty. Were it not for the provh::ions of the UNIFORM CODE OF :'lliLITARY JUS·
TICE, 10 U.S.C. § 831, it would seem likely that the Court would also have I"{'·
moved the right against self-incrimination from service personnel receiving sum·
mary courts-martial.
While civil liability per se does not constitute incrimination, a ch·il penalty having a punitive intent may. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2256-57
(McNaughton ed., 1961). There is an historic precedent for equating some civil
actions with criminal sanctions. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35
(1885), holding that:
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by th~ oornml<~lon of arr~no~•
against the law, are of this quasi~riminal nature, we tlunk that th•y ""' within tl:.~ n.awn .
of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no pt>n;on •hall bto oompt>lll'd In an;
criminal ease to be a witness against himself....

(in rem action).
Distinguishing between penalties that are quasi-criminal in natur{' is difficult.
See People v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 421, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812, 525 P.2d 716
(1974), finding that authorization to award exemplary damages in a civil action
does not expose the defendant to criminal sanctions against which he is protected
by the privilege against self-incrimination.
Deportation is not equivalent to incrimination. See Woodby ''· Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960); Chavez-Raya v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 519 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir. 1975).
Loss of livelihood generally does not appear to be a relevant consequence al·
though disbarment may. Cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 0968) (policeman
may be dismissed if he fails to answer specific questions narrowly directed to·
wards his duties and despite failure to grant immunity). Brtt see ex rei. Vining\'.
Florida REC, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973), finding that deprivation of livelihood may
be penal in nature, and that, where license revocation or suspension is the possible
result, compelling of testimony is a violation of the self-incrimination clauses of
the United States and Florida constitutions.

141

HeinOnline -- 78 Mil. L. Rev. 141 1977

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78

cases. The Supreme Court has refused to apply Miranda to noncustodial tax investigations. 132
While most tax investigations are noncustodial, the same is not
true of deportatjon proceedings. However, as deportion is viewed as
a noncriminal consequence, Miranda does not apply to deportation
iJ}terrogations. 133 Investigations which are primarily administrative
may not require warnings despite the possibility of later criminal
prosecution. 134 As prison discipline proceedings have been deterDisbarment has proven vexatious. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the
Supreme Court reversed Spevack's disbarment for invoking the privilege when he
was subpoenaed to produce financial records. While there is authority for believing that disbarment is quasi-criminal in nature despite its public service function,
see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), most states have continued to trent it
as civil in nature. See Segretti v. State Bar of California, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 793, 544 P.2d 929 (1976) ("the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys is not to punish but rather to protect the court and public from the
official ministrations of persons unfit to practice." 544 P.2d at 933); Maryland
State Bar Ass'n v. Sugerman, 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974). See generally Note,
Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. REV. 84 (1973); Chilingirian, State Disbarment Proceedi11gs
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 489 (1969).
Far more difficult to resolve than even the complex issues mentioned above Is
"treatment." Prior to In re Gault, it was believed that juveniles were unable to
assert the right against self-incrimination because their proceedings were beneficial in nature and designed for corrective purposes rather than for punishment.
Thus they were "non-criminal." While Gault has bestowed the privilege on
juvenile proceedings, the rationale of beneficial "treatment" remains. Thus in one
case a student suspected of smoking in violation of school rules was held not entitled to Miranda warnings because "the purpose of most school-house rules is to
find facts ... relating to special maladjustments of the child with a view toward
correcting it [sic]." Doe v. New Mexico, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. Rev.
489 (1975); dissent is at 542 P.2d 834 (1975). As the student was interrogated for
forty minutes and ultimately confessed to smoking marihuana, the case seems far
from a simple violation of school rules.
The same theory is used to justify denying the privilege to those who will be
committed to mental institutions rather than prisons. See Williams v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179, cert. denied,_ U.S._ (1975)
(defective delinquent treatment is not criminal in nature); Aronson, Should the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973).
It would seem clear that the dividing line between a punitive consequence and
legitimate treatment is rather fine. So too is the line between criminal conviction
and state initiated loss of livelihood. While it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will expand the definition of "incrimination" in the future, it and the state
courts will presumably have to draw a more understandable line between those
consequences which are incriminating and those which are not.
132 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
133
See Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 537 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.
1976).
134
Cf. United States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (officer at airport checkpoint did not have to warn suspect of his rights after being warned that
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mined to be administrative in nature, 135 Mimnda warnings appear
to be unnecessary in the course of such proceedings. 136

VIII. WARNING SUSPECTS
Miranda does not require any specific method of warning a suspect, and the actual method used by law enforcement agents varies
by jurisdiction and individual agent. Perhaps the most common
method is the oral warning in which the police warn their suspects
of their rights orally either from memory or by reading from a
rights warning card of one type or another. 137
Because oral warnings are susceptible both to error and to subsequent litigation at trial, many police use previously prepared
warning forms in lieu of 138 or in conjunction with oral warnings. 139
Normally a suspect will be handed such a form, told to read it, and
asked to acknowledge in writing receipt of his rights warnings.
Frequently, the warning portions of the form will be combined with
a waiver portion which will provide space for a suspect to either
exercise his rights or to waive them. Use of written waiver forms
tends to moot many of the usual errors that may accompany oral
warnings if only because the form itself is admissible in evidence at
trial while the officer who gives oral warnings is subject to crm;sexamination as to their content.
Written warnings and waiver certificates are not, of course, conclusive on the issue of Miranda compliance, for the suspect may
misunderstand the written notice, feel compelled by the circumstances of the situation, or be motivated to waive his rights by other
information given by the interrogating officers. 140 However, the
the suspect had a gun inside his bag). See generally cases cited at notes 109-114
supra and accompanying text.
135 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
136
I d. at 315.
137
Warning cards are in widespread use. See State v. Attebery, 110 Ariz. 354,
519 P.2d 53 (1974) (defendant was asked to read the card, then the police officer
read to the defendant, and then the defendant signed the card after answering the
officer's questions relating to his rights); Breedlove v. State, 516 P.2d 553 (1973)
(officer read the card to the suspect and then asked him if he understood each of
the rights).
138
Written explanation of rights will be sufficient if the suspect can read and understand them. They need not be supplemented by oral explanation. See State v.
McNeal,_ La. - · _ So.2d _ (1976) (18 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2524 (Feb. 23,
1976)).
139
Use of written explanation forms may moot errors made in previous oral warnings. See People v. Perry, 52 App. Div. 963, _ , 382 N. Y.S.2d 845, 846-t7l1976).
140
When the warning form has a waiver portion it is not unknown for unscrupulous police officers to tell suspects that signing the waiver portion of the form
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written format does place the prosecution in a better tactical position than does an oral warning.

IX.

WAIVING THE MIRANDA RIGHTS
A.

THE WAIVER FRAMEWORK

A suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless
he waives his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. To be
effective the waiver must be "made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 141 Thus, in the absence of a "spontaneous" statement
volunteered by the suspect, the burden is on the police to obtain a
valid Miranda waiver before interrogation may take place. 142 In
the words of Miranda:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and

a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel .... An express statement that the individual i11
willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver
will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in
fact eventually obtained.1 43

It is apparent that there is no need for a suspect to exercise affirmatively his right to remain silent. 144 Rather, he must waive his
privilege in order to make a statement. The right to counsel must,
however, be affirmatively exercised. 145 Unless limited to future
means only that the suspect has been warned of his rights. In such a case as a
practical matter the defense must attempt to persuade the court of the accuracy of
the defense story, in order to overcome the apparent voluntary defense waiver.
141 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, full knowledge of the
true circumstances surrounding the suspect's predictament is not required.
142 If Miranda is violated, the resulting statement will be excluded from evi·
dence.
143 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
144 While the suspect need not affirmatively exercise his right to remain silent,
there are numerous cases attempting to determine whether a suspect has in fact
exercised his privilege to remain silent, in whole or in part. See United States v.
Marchildon, 519 F .2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant's response to police request to inform meant only that suspect wouldn't talk about his sources of supply,
not that he wished to remain silent). As suspects are wont to make comments
when asked if they wish to make a statement, the courts are faced with an endless
variety of factual settings which must be individually analyzed to determine
whether the suspect was attempting to stop the interrogation.
14 5 While a suspect who does not waive his rights to counsel must be given a
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consultation 146 or to some specific limited use, 147 in the absence of
the suspect's express permission to allow it to continue, a request
for a lawyer will stop interrogation completely. 148
The ideal form of waiver would consist of a proper rights warning
followed by three questions: "Do you understand your rights? Do
you want a lawyer? Do you wish to make a statement?" 149 An answer of yes to the first and third questions and a negative to the
second create a proper waiver. However, such an express waiver is
rare. Most cases dealt with in the courts 150 appear to involve alleged waivers in which either the suspect stated that he understood
his rights and then proceeded to answer police questions, 151 or went
immediately from the warnings to the interrogation. 152 Faced with
this situation the courts have generally accepted implied waivers 153
when convinced of their existence. Of course, in doing so the courts
must weigh all of the surrounding circumstances, for the waiver
must be voluntary.
It is important to distinguish between cases in which the suspect
spontaneously began making a statement after receiving warnlawyer before an interrogation may take place, Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436,
470-71 (1966), in the absence of interrogation, counsel need not automatically be
supplied, and the suspect desiring counsel is well advised to affirmatively request
one.
146 See People v. Tunage, 45 Cal. App. 3d 201, 119 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
147
See People v. Madison, 56 Ill. 2d 476, 309 N.E.2d 11 (1974) <defendant's statement that he would give a statement but not sign it until a public defender was
present held not to prevent interrogation as it was not a request for counsel).
148
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). See State v. Nicholson, 19
Ore. App. 226, 232, 527 P.2d 140, 142 (1974), eoulra People v. Madison, 56 Ill. 2d
476, 309 N.E.2d 11 (1974). The court held that a defendant's refusal to sign his
statement until he had a lawyer present was a general request for counsel which
should have stopped the interrogation immediately.
149
This form of express waiver is in use in the Army, for example. See Dep't of
the Army Form 3881, Rights Warning/Waiver Certificate. Note that a defective
warning will usually render any waiver a nullity.
150
It must be remembered that perfect waivers are seldom litigated. Thus, it can
be presumed that numerous express waivers are obtained by police, but that those
cases involving implied waiver are apt to be challenged.
151 See People v. Johnson, 13 Ill. App. 2d 1020, 1025, 304 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1973).
152 See State v. Pineda, 110 Ariz. 342, 519 P.2d 41 (1974).
153 See United States v. Moreno-Lopez, 466 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Gochenour, 47 C.M.R. 979 (A.F.C.lll.R. 1973); Commonwealth v. Valliere,_ Mass. _ , _ , 321 N.E.2d 625, 631 (1974); Braziel v. State, ___ Tenn.
App. _ , 529 S.W.2d 501 (Crim. App.), eert. denied, ___ Tenn. __ , 529 S.W.2d
501 (1975); Moreno v. State, 511 S. W.2d 273, 276-77 <Tex. 1974); State \'. Breznick, _ Vt. _ , _ , 356 A.2d 540, 542 (1976). But see Bauer\', State, ___ Ind.
App. 2d _ , 300 N.E.2d 364 (1974) (printed waiver form insufficient in absence of
"interrogative assurances" that the suspect understood his rights); State v. Harris, 24 N.C. App. 412, 219 S.E.2d 266 (1975) (explicit waiver required). See also,
J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at 61-63.
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ings 154 and those in which he began answering questions after receiving warnings. In the first situation, the statement is voluntary
and spontaneous and waiver is virtually automatic; in the second,
waiver must be found from the circumstances. Presence of the suspect's attorney at the interrogation is persuasive, if not absolute
proof, of waiver and will usually serve to do away with the need for
either waiver and/or warnings. 155
A recurring problem is that of the suspect who refuses to sign a
written waiver. The courts have consistently held that the mere refusal to sign such a waiver does not make a subsequent statement
involuntary. 156 On the other hand, it may be strong evidence of the
suspect's desire not to waive his rights and may consequently result
in a finding of nonwaiver. 157 A related problem is the suspect who
makes an oral statement but refuses to make a written one. While
such a refusal may mean only that the suspect has gotten "cold
feet," it may also indicate a mistaken belief that Miranda bars oral
statements from use in court but not written ones. In such a case,
the oral statement will be inadmissible 158 because of a basic misunderstanding of the Miranda rights.

B.

KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER

A valid Miranda waiver presupposes that the suspect involved is
aware of and understands his Miranda rights. A defect in the warnings may thus make waiver impossible. 159 Just as the warnings
154 Errors in warnings can frequently be cured by spontaneous statements from
the suspect, for it is a rare case in which such a statement is found to have been an
improper product of coercive circumstances.
155 See White v. State, 294 Ala. 265, 314 So.2d 857 (1975). See generally J. ZAGEL,
supra note 72, at 58-59. While warnings in such a case may be unnecessary, as
Mr. Zagel suggests, they are well advised to moot future claims of error.
156 See United States v. Sawyer, 504 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Reynolds, 496 F.2d
158 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1970);
Hewitt v. State, 261 Ind. 71, 300 N.E.2d 94 (1973); State v. Jones, 35 Ohio App.
2d 84, 300 N.E.2d 230 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cost, _ Pa. Super. __ , 362
A.2d 1027 (1976).
157 See Millican v. State,_ Ind. App. 2d _ , 300 N.E.2d 359 (1973).
158
See State v. Jones, 37 Ohio St. 2d 21, 306 N.E.2d 409 (1974) (suspect made an
oral statement but refused to continue while police took written notes).
159
Miranda expressly rejects the possibility that warnings may be omitted because the suspect may have prior knowledge of his rights. "[w]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is
free to exercise his privileges at that point in time." 384 U.S. 436, •168-69 (1966).
Note that the suspect who persistently interferes with a police attempt to warn
him of his rights by claiming prior knowledge may be held to his statement if the
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must be properly communicated, 160 so too must the suspect comprehend them and the effects of waiver. Should the suspect lack the
ability to understand the rights or to make an intelligent 161 waiver
decision, a waiver
be void. Thus, in any given case, questions
relating to the suspect's intelligence, physical and mental condition, 162 and the circumstances surrounding the waiver will be highly
relevant. 163 To a large extent the determination of the voluntariness of the waiver subsumes the traditional common law determination of the voluntariness of a confession. Miranda explicitly bars
the use of threats, trickery, and cajolery to obtain waivers 164 although trickery that does not overbear the will of the suspect may
be acceptable after a valid waiver.

'"ill

C.

STATE AND MILITARY RESTRICTIONS
ON WAIVER

Many of the states have formulated their own statutory or
judge-made restrictions on waiver of the Miranda rights. Perhaps
the most interesting rule can be found in New York, which has
police stop and proceed to obtain a waiver. See United States v. Sikorski, 21
C.M.A. 345,45 C.M.R. 119 (1972); State v. Thomas, __ Wash. App. ---· ---· 553
P.2d 1357, 1363 (1976).
160 The warnings must, for example, be given in a language that the suspect understands. Cf. People v. Gonzales, 22 Ill. App. 2d 83, 316 N.E.2d 800 I 1974).
Another difficulty may be the rapid "ritualistic" fashion that the police :;ometimes
use to give warnings, see People v. Andino, 80 Misc. 2d 155, 362 N. Y.S.2d 766,
770-71 (1974).
161 See Greenwell v. State,_ Md. _ , __ , 363 A.2d 555, 561 U976) <minimum
ability to understand must be found).
162 See Commonwealth v. Hosey, _
Mass. - · __ , 334 N.E.2d 44, 48 (}975)
(emotional upset complicated by gratuitous police information that it would bt'
difficult to get a lawyer voided the waiver). Poor physical or mental condition does
not necessarily make waiver impossible. See United States v. Choice, 392 F.
Supp. 460, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("This District, however, has rejected a per Sl' rule
that a serious gunshot wound must be presumed to leave its victim incapable of
exercising free volition and making rational choices " (citations omitted)); People
v. Barrow, _ Cal. App. 3d _ , _ , 131 Cal. Rptr. 913, 918 (1976) (waiver sustained despite evidence of alcohol use and emotional upset); McKittrick \', State,
541 S. W.2d 177 (Tex. 1976) (narcotics addict).
163 Any form of threat or inducement may make the waiver a nullity, just as the
same conduct may make a confession involuntary. Note People \'. Andino, __ _
Misc. 2d 155, 362 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770-71 (1974) (determination that uncounseled
drug defendant may not waive Miranda rights when waiver may be induced by
what amounted to plea bargaining in view of the unusually severe sentencing consequences of New York drug laws in the absence of plea bargaining) . •\lirarzda
states that "lengthy interrogation or incommunicado interrogation before a statement is made is strong evidence of an invalid waiver." 384 U.S. at 476.
164
384 U.S. at 476.
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held 165 that a suspect who has obtained counsel cannot waive his
right to counsel at an interrogation unless an affirmative waiver is
made in the presence of the attorney. Somewhat obviously the New
York rule tends to prevent lawyerless interrogations after counsel
has entered the scene. Such a rule prevents law enforcement agents
from nullifying the right to counsel. 166 A counterpart is found in
military law.
A number of states have created special restrictions on obtaining
statements from juveniles, often requiring the presence of family
members or an attorney before the Miranda rights can be
waived. 167 Because of the diversity of state rules, statutes, and interpretations, it is essential in any state case to scrutinize state law
carefully when determining what is necessary for a valid waiver. 168

D.

SHOWING WAIVER AT TRIAL

Prior to Miranda the primary issue surrounding a confession or
admission was the voluntariness of the statement offered in evidence. While this voluntariness doctrine remains, Miranda has had
the pragmatic effect of merging the traditional voluntariness inquiry into the Miranda waiver determination. As the waiver question takes into account all of the questions that usually surround the
voluntariness inquiry, a finding of a valid waiver normally dictates a
finding that the statement itself was made voluntarily. Consequently, the issue to be litigated is the validity of the Miranda
waiver. The procedures and burdens that usually accompany the
traditional voluntariness inquiry normally apply to the Miranda
waiver inquiry. 169
165
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663,
666 (1968).
166
Interestingly, the Court of Military Appeals has held that interrogations of
military personnel who have obtained counsel cannot take place unless counsel has
been previously notified and given an opportunity to attend the interrogation.
United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976). McOmber was
the product of a number of cases in which military interrogators obtained statements, after proper warnings and waivers, from defendants in the absence of their
defense counsel.
167
See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972) (child's parents or
guardians must be informed of the Miranda rights and child must be allowed to
consult with parents or guardians or attorney before waiver can take place); In rc
F.G., 511 S.W.2d 370, 373-74 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974) (Texas Family Code held
to require attorney's concurrence before juvenile can waive privilege against selfincrimination). See also Hall v. State,_ Ind. _ , 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976).
168
See Hogan v. State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. App. 1976) (state statute, Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.111(d) (4), required written waiver of counsel in the presence of two
attesting witnesses; failure to so waive held nonprejudicial, however).
169
See generally Lederer, The Law of Confessions-The Voluntariness Doctrine,
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Once the issue is raised, the burden is on the government to
prove, usually by a preponderance of the evidence,l 70 that applicable rights warnings were given and that a valid waiver was obtained. Normally, this is done via testimony of the officer who gave
the warnings and obtained the waiver, or of a witness to the event,
although a written warning and waiver form may be used. Some
courts will allow a police officer to testify that he read the warnings
from a standard card that he carried, rather than requiring that he
testify to the specific warnings from memory. 171 Others will reject
such a procedure in the absence of the doctrine of past recollection
recorded. The mere statement, "I read his rights to him," is
insufficient. 172
A written rights waiver certificate is admissible when the proper
foundation is laid. 173 The defense will usually attempt to show an
incomplete or confusing warning and either nonwaiver or a misunderstood waiver by the defendant. Because much of the usual litigation surrounding a waiver concerns what actually happened,
interrogators are well advised to record their session on tape or
videotape. 174 Similarly, when doubt exists as to what actually occurred, a defense counsel should, where local procedure permits,
request that the judge make special findings as to the actual facts
surrounding the warnings and alleged waiver. 175
74 MIL. L. REV. 67, 88 (1976), for a discussion of the specific procedural rules and
burdens of proof in this area.
170 Miranda requires that a statement taken without counsel places a "heavy bur·
den" on the government to demonstrate a knowing intelligent wah•er. 384 U.S. at
475. This has been interpreted to mean a preponderance. Cf. Lego \'. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1972). See Hart. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 644, 645, 224 S.E.2d
755, 756 (1976). A number of states may require higher burdens.
171 See Lewis v. State, 296 So. 2d 575 (Fla. App. 1974). Note that testimony as to
the specific warnings should not violate the hearsay rule as the statement is not
offered for the truth of its contents, but rather to establish that warnings were
given. See State v. McClain, 220 Kan. 80, 551 P.2d 806 (1976).
172 Cf. State v. Welch,_ La._, 337 So. 2d 1114 (1976) (witness testified that
officer had not advised defendant of his right to counsel).
173 When the written waiver is the sole waiver in the case, the best e\·idence rule
may be applicable. Cf. Sanders v. State, _ Ind. __ , 348 N.E.2d 642 11976) <is·
sue not raised as no motion to suppress the confession was ever made).
174 See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F .2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); People\'. Gonzales, 22
Ill. App. 3d 83, 316 N.E.2d 800 (1974) (videotaped interrogation showed voluntary
waiver). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4
(1975). Note that use of tape recordings will require special efforts to authenticate
the evidence.
175 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1976) C'iti1zg Evans \'.
United States, 375 F .2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), for the proposition that a federal trial
court should make specific findings on the record with regard to .\liranda warn·
ings and waiver. (Failure to do so is not necessarily reversible error.) Compare
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL OF INTERROGATIONS

Law enforcement agents have frequently questioned suspects
known to have had counsel. When, as is often the case, the suspects
in question waive their Mimnda rights and make statements in the
absence of their attorneys, the defense counsel have little alternative other than to allege at trial that either Miranda has been violated or that the attorney-client privilege has been infringed.
To date, at least two jurisdictions have fashioned rules to prevent
such conduct. New York has interpreted its state constitution to
make waiver of the Mimnda rights impossible once counsel has
been obtained unless waiver takes place in the presence of the attorney. 176 The Court of Military Appeals has construed the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to require that when interrogators know
that a suspect has counsel they must give that counsel notice of the
planned interrogation and adequate opportunity to attend. 177
However, overwhelmingly, the majority rule, both federaP 78 and
state, 179 is that the police need not warn counsel of an impending
interrogation of their clients. Further, most courts have held that a
suspect who has previously invoked his right to counsel may later
waive it in the absence of counsel. 180 A number of courts have, however, while sustaining the legality of questioning without notice to
counsel, raised significant ethical questions about its
propriety 181-particularly when the questioning is done by a prosecutor.182
Evans, supra, with United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975). Specific factual findings do not appear to be required. However, the defense would be
wise in many cases to attempt to obtain them.
176
See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 448, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1976); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325,329,239 N.E.2d 537,539,292 N.Y.S.2d
663, 666 (1968).
177
United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 297, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976).
178 Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d
217, 223 (2d Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein). But see United State!> v.
Flores-Calvillo, _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1976) (19 Crim. L. Rep. 2405, Sept. 14,
1976) (defendant who had invoked her right to counsel could not waive that right
later without the assistance of counsel).
179
Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 238-39, 219 S.E.2d 158, 159-60 (1975); People v.
Sandoval, 41 Ill. App. 3d 741, 353 N.E.2d 715 (1976); Goldstein v. State, 89 Nev.
527, 516 P.2d 111 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 448 Pa. 206, 292 A.2d 302
(1972); Lamb v. Commonwealth, _ Va. _ , 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976); State v. Gilcrist, 12 Wash. App. 733, 531 P.2d 814 (1975).
180 See generally section XI infra.
181
Compare United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 923 (1973), citing Disciplinary Rule 7-104 of the ABA CODE OF PROFES·
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY with State v. Gilcrist, 12 Wash. App. 733, 531 P.2d 814
(1975).
182
See the cases collected at United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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XL

THE EFFECTS OF INVOKING .l1IRANDACOMPLIANCE
AND NONCOMPLIANCE

A.

INVOKING MIRANDA

As has been previously discussed, 183 the Court in Miranda
created a framework which prevents a statement from being obtained during a custodial interrogation unless a valid waiver of
rights has been obtained from the suspect. Although it is clear from
Miranda that a nonwaiver is to be considered an affirmative exercise of the Mimnda rights, the theoretical rule can be difficult to
apply to the facts of an individual case, particularly when most
courts recognize implied waivers.
The clearest invocation of Miranda is a suspect's affirmative refusal to speak, accompanied by a request for a lawyer. In such a
case, the police are duty bound to cease interrogation 184 and to obtain counsel. 185 Either a refusal to speak or a request for counsel,
unless qualified in some matter, will stop questioning. However, it
is possible for a qualified exercise of rights to be made. A suspect
may refuse to discuss a specific topic but remain willing to talk
about other matters; the suspect may wish counsel but only at a
later time; discussion at the moment may be rejected in favor of a
later statement. Accordingly. each case must be looked at closely to
determine to what extent the Miranda rights have actually been
exercised. To the extent to which they have actually been invoked,
the police must comply and/or cease interrogation.

B. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 1l1IRANDA
The price of noncompliance with Mi1·anda is simple-exclusion of
the resulting evidence from trial. Subject to the effects of statutory
attempts to overrule Miranda, 186 the case requires that the product
of a Miranda violation and its derivative evidence be excluded from
trial. 187 One significant exception to this exclusionary rule exists.
183

Section IX supra.
The extent to which interrogation may be resumed after the su:;pect has refused to make a statement is unclear and is discussed in section XI, part C, i11/ra.
185 However, the police may opt simply to discontinue the interrogation. This is
not to suggest that the police may arbitrarily refuse to supply counsel, but if counsel is in fact unavailable, the police may choose to notify coun!lel and discontinue
questioning. See section VI, part A, supra.
186
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). See ge11erally section XII infra.
187
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966): "[N]o evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
184
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The Supreme Court has expressly approved the use of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes. 188
This limited inroad on the exclusionary rule results from an increasing Supreme Court dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule
generally and Miranda specifically. By allowing such evidence to be
used for impeachment, the Court has expressly countenanced police
violation of Mimnda (and perhaps more importantly has encouraged it), for now the Court has given an interrogator who has been
stymied by a suspect's refusal to talk, a reason to attempt to overcome his assertion of his right to remain silent. 189 Perhaps for this
reason, a number of jurisdictions have declined to follow the Supreme Court's lead and have expressly rejected the impeachment
exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. 190

C.

MULTIPLE INTERROGATIONS

Multiple interrogations present three significant problems: the
degree to which proper warnings and waiver at one interrogation
persist and extend to a later interrogation; the extent to which a
defective warning or waiver at an interrogation may taint a subsequent interrogation; and whether an individual who exercises his
Miranda rights at one interrogation may be questoned again at a
later time. Each question will be examined separately.
The degree to which proper Miranda warnings and waiver may
(in violation of Miranda) can be used." Despite some early state decisions to the
contrary, Miranda appears to have intended to ban derivative evidence (the fruit
of the poisonous tree) as well as evidence obtained in direct violation of Miranda.
But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 460-61 (1974) (White, J. concurring).
The ultimate effect of Miranda on derivative evidence is now unclear in view of
the Supreme Court's increasingly hostile treatment of Miranda. See Comment,
The Effects of Tucker on the "Fruits" of Il.legally Obtained Statements, 24 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 689 (1975), discussing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
188 Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Note that while statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment, the statements must be voluntary in the non-Miranda sense. Kidd v.
State,_ Md. _ , _ A.2d _ , 20 Crim. L. Rep. 2238 (Nov. 3, 1976); Booker v.
State, 326 So. 2d 791, 793 (Miss. 1976); cf. United States v. Diop, __ F.2d __ (2d
Cir. 1976) (filed 3 Dec. 1976). The Court may have opened the door for wider use
of improperly obtained statements. See Greenfield v. State, _ So. 2d _ , 20
Crim. L. Rep. 2119 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (invocation of Miranda rights used to
rebut insanity claim).
189 Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 725 (1975) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
190 United States v. Girard, 23 C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 438 (1975); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69 (1976)
(California Constitution construed); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d
657 (1971) (Hawaii Constitution construed); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pn.
244, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (1975) (Pennsylvania Constitution construed).

152

HeinOnline -- 78 Mil. L. Rev. 152 1977

1978]

MIRANDA V • •4RIZONA

persist and excuse the absence of warnings and waiver (or perhaps
more importantly an incomplete or improper waiver) at a subsequent interrogation is unclear and is usually addressed on a caseby-case basis by the courts. If the time period between interrogations is short and the multiple interrogations can be characterized
as one continuous interrogation or a single transaction, the lack of
warnings at the later interrogation will be harmless. 191 However,
what defines a "continuous interrogation," or otherwise justifies
waiving warnings at a second or later interrogation, depends solely
upon the facts of each case and the approach of the individual cowt.
Because a delay between waiver and interrogation or between successive interrogations may easily taint a statement, 192 warnings
should be given and a new waiver obtained at each interrogation to
moot possible error and exclusion.
The extent to which an improperly obtained statement may taint
further interrogations despite an otherwise proper Mimnda waiver
is a difficult question to determine in the absence of the specific
facts of a given case. The law recognizes that any of the many factors 193 that could render a statement involuntary may well have
continued effect-enough effect to render a later statement involuntary. The mere knowledge that a statement has already been given
See United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1974) !the ultimate
question is only: "Did the defendant with full knowledge of his legal rights, knowingly and intentionally relinquish them?"); United States v. Schultz, 19 C.~I.A.
311, 41 C.M.R. 311 (1970) (7-hour delay did not affect "single continuous interrogation"); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974) (14 hours between
waiver and final statement did taint statement); State\' . .Myers, 345 A.2d 500, 503
(Me. 1975) (17-hour period between warnings and statement did not vitiate warnings when defendant was reminded at the interrogation of the warnings previously
given and he acknowledged them); State v. Reha, 86 N.l\L 291, 523 P.2d 26 ICt.
App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974) (two sets of warnings were
sufficient; third set was unnecessary in view of the short delay); State v. ~lcZorn.
288 N.C. 417, 434-35, 219 S.E.2d 201, 212 (1975) 120-30 minute delav between
•
interrogations did not affect prior warnings).
192
See United States v. Weston, 51 C.M.R. 868 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) 120-da\' delav
and different offenses required new waiver); United States,•. Boster, 38 c.~I.R.
681 (A.B.R. 1968) (two interrogation sessions found separate and distinct); State
v. White, 288 N.C. 44, 52, 215 S.E.2d 557, 562 (1975) Ia number of hours' deJa\'
between statement required a new warning and waiver when the second interr~
gation took place at a new location and under different circumstances); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 460 Pa. 699, _ , 334 A.2d 594, 599 (1975) I 12-hour delav
between initial waiver and confession required a nE'w set of warning<' when th~
interrogation was broken a number of times and thE' <'Usppct was allowed to sleep
for a period).
193
Incomplete warnings, erroneous warnings, failure to comply with an attempted exercise of the right against self-incrimination or the right to counsel,
physical coercion, threats, inducements and psychological coE'rcion, to name the
more usual violations.
191
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may be considered a major factor in a suspect's decision to make a
subsequent statement. 194
On the other hand, it is equally apparent that many of the errors
that can cause a statement to be inadmissible may either be exceedingly minor in scope and of little continued effect, or may be
adequately counterbalanced by rights warnings and circumstances.
The courts have generally treated these cases on a case-by-case
basis, looking carefully at the unique facts of each to determine the
probability that the impropriety of the first interrogation was overcome by procedures used in the later one. 195
The burden to show voluntariness remains with the prosecution,
which must show the later statement to have been obtained in full
compliance with Miranda and the voluntariness doctrine. The burden may be difficult to meet under these conditions. The courts have
apparently treated cases involving only Miranda violations at the
earlier interrogation somewhat more leniently than cases involving
violations of the pre-Miranda voluntariness doctrine. 1 96 In all such
cases involving a later custodial interrogation, 197 proper warnings
must be given and a proper waiver obtained. If this is done and the
prosecution can show that any prior taint has been dissipated 198 by
time, special warnings, or circumstances, the statement is apt to be
admissible. 199 Statements involving physical coercion, threats or un194
The suspect may believe that the "cat is out of the bag" and he has nothing to
Jose by confessing further.
195 The courts have generally rejected the theory that the "cat is out of the bag"
rationale requires suppression of ali subsequent statements unless perhaps the
suspect is told that his prior statement is inadmissible. See Tanner v. Vincent, __
F.2d _ , _ , 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2509 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 1976) (and cases cited
therein). However, the inadmissibility of the first statement is a factor that must
be considered when weighing the admissibility of the later statement. See State v.
Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 213 S.E.2d 247 (1975).
196 See United States v. Toral, 536 F .2d 893 (9th Cir. 1976) (where first interrogation had little that was inherently coercive and was defective almost exclusively
because of the police failure to give warnings, the later statement was untainted).
See generally C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (2d ed. 1972).
197
While Miranda warnings only apply to custodial interrogation, it would seem
only logical that an inadmissible statement could taint a subsequent statement
obtained during noncustodial interrogation. However, the balancing test usually
applied would likely make it easier for the prosecution to meet its burden in such a
case.
198
An exploitation of the first statement will likely render the second inadmissible. Similarly, a statement by the accused to the effect that "I wouldn't tell you
this if I hadn't talked to you yesterday" will probably doom the statement if the
prior statement had been inadmissible.
199 See Tanner v. Vincent, _
F.2d _ , 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2509 (2d Cir. 1976);
People v. Linwood, 30 Ill. App. 3d 454, 333 N.E.2d 520 (1975); State v. Davis, __
La._, 336 So. 2d 805 (1976); State v. Dakota, 300 Minn. 12, 217 N.W.2d 748
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lawful inducement will be more difficult to salvage. 200 While not required, 201 interrogators attempting to repair an improperly obtained statement should not only give the usual warnings but should
notify the suspect that the earlier statement should be considered
inadmissible at court, in order to moot later litigation. 202
By far the most difficult question in this area is whether a suspect's exercise of his Mimnda rights prevents questioning at a later
time. Clearly, competing considerations are im·olved. Miranda expressly required that questioning must stop as soon as a suspect
invokes his rights. 203 To allow repetitive attempts at interrogation
can only be regarded as a wearing away of the Miranda armor,
even if Miranda warnings are given during each attempt.
On the other hand, a suspect may desire to change his mind and to
make a statement-particularly if made aware of newly discovered
evidence. If confession evidence is desirable, and society persists in
viewing it as such, society has an interest in balancing the seemingly absolute privilege against self-incrimination with a police right
to ask a suspect to reconsider. The law is unsettled.
In 1975, the Supreme Court in deciding Michigan t• ••ltosley 204
attempted to resolve the problem but left the area in near hopeless
confusion. Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection
with a series of robberies. He was brought to the police department
where he was advised of his rights, after which he affirmatively re(1974). But see Randall v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1974); United States u
rei. Stephen J. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970) !holding that under thl'
circumstances the later statement was tainted).
200 Violations of the traditional voluntariness doctrine are deemed more likely to
have substantial long term effect than the failure to give the prophylactic
Miranda warnings. Arguably this is correct (f one views the station housl.' or cus·
todial interrogation atmosphere as less coercive than intentional affirmatin• mis·
conduct. Similarly, threats, inducements, and so forth will usually be the results
of intentional misconduct, while most .\fira11da violations may be unintentional.
Under such circumstances the public policy behind the exclusionary rule should be
applied differently, as the probability of deterring police misconduct will differ.
For a different justification of different treatment, sec C. McCOIU!ICK, EVIDENCE
345 (2d ed. 1972).
201 See Tanner v. Vincent, ____ F.2d _____ ,
___ , 19 Crim. L. Rep. 250~1 12d
Cir. 1976); State v. Dakota, 300 1976); State v. Dakota, 300 ~linn. 12, 16, 217
N.W. 2d 748, 751 (1974).
2- 02- See-United States v. Seay, 24 C. M.A. 10, 51 C.M.R. 60 (1975) l"ln addition to
rewarning the accused, the preferable course in seeking an additional statement
would include advice that prior illegal admissions or other improperly obtained
evidence which incriminated the accused cannot be used against him").
203 " • • • if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him." 384 U.S. 436, 445
(1966). See also 384 U.S. at 473-74.
204 423 U.S. 96 (1975), hereinafter cited as .lloslt'y.
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fused to answer any questions about the robberies. A few hours
later, a different detective approached Mosley in his cell, gave
proper warnings, and questioned him about a homicide. Mosely admitted participation.
The majority of the Court held that Mosely's Miranda rights had
not been violated in that the first interrogation had stopped immediately when he refused to answer questions, and the second session pertained to an entirely different offense. 205 The majority appears to have highlighted the fact that while Mosley exercised his
privilege against self-incrimination, he did not request counsel. 206
Justices Brennan and Marshall, 207 dissenting, pointed out that the
homicide was in fact connected with the robberies, as Mosley had
been arrested only after a "tip" that concerned both offenses, and
that not only had the interrogations been connected, but that Mosley's refusal to discuss the robberies should have been construed to
have included the homicide. More importantly, the dissenters
criticized, properly it would seem, the majority's holding 208 that so
long as a refusal to talk was "scrupulously honored" interrogation
could resume at some later time. Not only did such a test seem to
further erode Miranda, 209 but it created a test without meaning,
for no indication of time limit between interrogations appears in the
opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall suggested that subsequent
interrogation should be prohibited until counsel was appointed and
present or until the accused was arraigned. 210
Thus, at present the police may attempt to question a suspect
who has previously asserted his right against self-incrimination so
long as they honored the original refusal to talk and so long as some
unknown time period existed between the two interrogations. Further, the Court has arguably ruled only on a subsequent interrogation for an offense unrelated to the first interrogation, although the
Court's ultimate direction appears clear. It is, however, important
to note that the majority in Mosley highlighted the fact that Mosley
had not affirmatively requested counsel, suggesting strongly to the
205
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated: " ... I
suspect that in the final analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the
standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to silence by a properly informed defendant. I think the Court should say so now." 423 U.S. at 168.
2os 423 U.S. at 104.
207 423 U.S. at 111.
208 ld. at 114-15. For further discussion see Note, 21 VILL. L. REV. 761 (197676).
2 0 9 Compare Mosley with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
210
423 U.S. at 116.
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reader that a request for counsel might block subsequent interrogation until counsel was obtained. 211 Such a rule would find some precedent in the decisions of a number of lower courts. 212
At present the state of the law may be summarized thusly: It is
clearly constitutional to request a statement, after proper warnings
and waiver, of a suspect who has previously refused to make a
statement about a different offense, if there has been an "appreciable" delay between interrogations and if the circumstances do not
seem coercive. It is pmbably proper to attempt a later interrogation involving the same offense that the suspect originally refused
to discuss so long as his original refusal to talk was "scrupulously
honored." 213 It is also clear that the Court has rejected the notion
that Miranda expressly forbids renewal of interrogation. 214 All
other questions, particularly those cases in which the suspect did in
fact request counsel, 215 are left open for later decision.
ld. at 104, note 10: [Miranda] "directed that 'the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present 'only' [i]f the individual states that he wants an attor·
ney.'" However, the Supreme Court in Brewer \'. Williams, __ U.S. __ , 45
U.S.L.W. 4287, 4292 (1977) appears to accept the proposition that a defendant
may always waive his right to counsel although it is "incumbent upon the State to
prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.' " [citations omitted]. Thus, it seems that a defendant may be questioned a second time even though at the first session he requested counsel. For
the second session to yield an admissible statement, however, in the absence of
counsel, the accused must intentionally and knowingly give up the right to
counsel-arguably from Breu•er's context a higher standard than normally used in
Miranda cases.
212 See United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
213 See State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, __ , 545 P.2d 986, 991 !1976); People v.
Almond, 67 Mich. App. 713, 717-18, 242 N. W.2d 498, 501 !1976); Commonwealth
v. Reiland, _ Pa. Super. Ct. _ , 359 A.2d 811 (1976); State \'. Robbins, 15
Wash. App. 108, 547 P.2d 288 (1976). There are numerous similar cases predating
Mosley. See United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975); State v.
O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 71,216 N.W.2d 822,829 (1974). Note United States\'. Olof,
527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to cut off questioning was not "scrupulously
honored" and later statement was held inadmissible); Harne v. State, 534 S. W.2d
703 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1976).
2 14 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1975).
215 While some courts have held that a request for counsel prevents later interrogation until counsel has been obtained and present, see United States v. FloresCavillo, _ F.2d_, 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2405 (9th Cir. July 14, 1976); People v.
Parnell, 31 Ill. App. 3d 627, 630, 334 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1975), numerous courts
have found a request for counsel to be of no particular significance in deterring a
later interrogation. See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976);
People v. Morgan, 39 III. App. 3d 588, 350 N.E.2d 27 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Orton,_ Mass App. Ct._, 355 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1976): Buckingham v. State,
_Tenn. App. _ , 540 S. W.2d 660 (Ct. Crim. App.), cert denied, _ Tenn. __ ,
_ S. W.2d _ (1976).See also Brown v. United States, 359 A.2d 600 <D.C. Ct.
App. 1976) (interrogating detective was unaware of suspect's prior request for
counsel, statement was admissible). See also n.210 supra, discussing Brewer v.
Williams,_ U.S._ (1977).
211
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OVERRULING MIRANDA BY STATUTE

Believing that Miranda was a major impediment to effective law
enforcement, police, prosecutors, and much of the nation's more
vocal citizenry greeted the decision with outrage that has cooled
only slightly with time. The national displeasure resulted in a Congressional attempt to overrule Miranda by statute which President
Johnson signed into law as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 216 Insofar as Miranda was concerned, the
statute attempted to replace the Miranda exclusionary rule that
required suppression of a statement obtained without proper
Miranda warnings and waiver, with a pre-Miranda voluntariness
test. 217
At the time of its enactment, the "Post-Miranda Act" was considered unlikely to affect Miranda directly, as Miranda was considered a decision resulting from constitutional interpretation and beyond statutory control. 218 Accordingly, while other sections of the

216

Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The relevant portion of the Act usually
termed either the "Post-Miranda Act" or the "Anti-Miranda Act" is 18 U.S.C. §
3501 (1970). See generally 0. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 139-45, 163-64 (1973); and Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEo. L.J. 305 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Gandara). For the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 see [1968] U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. NEWS 2124-2150.
217 18 u.s.c § 3501(b) (1970):
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take Into consideration all
the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, Including (I) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if It was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3)
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such
defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance or counsel when questioned and
when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken Into consideration
by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness or the confession.
218 Despite some argument that Congress should have acted to limit the federal
courts' jurisdiction to review on appeal, a finding that a confession was voluntary
in the § 3501 sense, see [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2139-2160, Congress seems to have abandoned its attempt to expressly limit federal jurisdiction,
and there seems to have been significant doubt that the statute could actually
affect Miranda. See Gandara, supra note 216, at 311-13; 0. STEPHENS, supra
note 216, at 142-45. Professor Stephens suggests at page 146 that the statutory
effort to limit Miranda may have been intended to signal the Supreme Court that
it had gone too far and should reconsider Miranda and its general approach in
criminal matters.
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statute had effect, 219 the Miranda portion tended to be ignored. 220
However, the Supreme Court's clear dislike for Miranda has resulted in a significant shift in the potential importance of the
statute.
In Michigan v. Tucke1·, 221 the Supreme Court apparently found
that Mi1·anda lacked constitutional dimension and served only as
"prophylactic rules." 222 While there is surely every reason to believe that the Warren Court had not intended to set the Mimnda
decision in concrete for all time, 223 Mimnda was clearly a decision
of constitutional dimension. With the Court's present view, however, it seems possible that the "Post-Miranda Act" could be found
by the Court to have pre-empted the Court's "nonconstitutionally
required" Miranda framework.
Although the Supreme Court had not had the occasion to construe
the legality and effect of the "Post-Miranda Act" by the early part
of 1977, some courts had begun to apply it to prevent exclusion of
statements that would have been suppressed under .lfim nda. 224
While at present Miranda governs, the long term effect of the
statutory attempt to overrule it is unknown and cannot be dismissed
as clearly ineffective.

XIII.

MIRANDA'S FUTURE

Miranda has been with us since 1966. Although it seems unlikely
that it will ever pass from the legal scene completely. it would take
an incurable optimist to predict its continued vitality in even its
present form by 1980. The Supreme Court has consistently 225
The sections attempting to overrule the Courts' decisions in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 11957),
were apparently successful.
220 See Gandara, supra note 216, at 311-13, indicating that federal law enforcement agents have adhered to Miranda and that many of the United States Attorneys did not urge § 3501 on Federal District Courts to save confessions, although
the Southern District of New York "had invoked section 3501 in several cases
... " Gandara at 312.
2 2 1 417 u.s. 433 (1974).
222 I d. at 466.
223 Miranda expressly recognized that other effective techniques might be developed which could replace the warnings. 384 U.S. 436, 467 U966).
224 See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1136-1138 UOth Cir. 1975) which
states,
219

We have held that \"oluntariness is the sole constituuonnl rt>qul•lt" t:<•'·.,mtn~; the ndml<:slon of
a confession in e\·idence.... We belie\"e th•t Michi1:3n ,._ Turkl'r
• nlthou~;b Mt tnw•h·tn~;
the provisions of § 3501, supra. did. in effl.'ct, adopt and uphold th~ con•utuuon3hty of ttc
provisions thereof.

510 F.2d at 1137 (citations omitted).
225 But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); and United States v. Hale, 422
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undercut its stepchild 226 and has clearly made preparations for its
eventual demise. Congress has attempted to overrule it, 227 and
many of the subordinate federal and state courts have made a point
of distinguishing between statements inadmissible under the voluntariness doctrine and statements obtained "only" in violation of
Miranda. 228 The outpouring of sentiment that accompanies every
case taken by the Supreme Court that might be used as a vehicle to
further hasten Miranda's end indicates that much of the nation continues to reject the case.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the continued resistance
to Miranda is that there seems little empirical evidence to substantiate the many claims made on behalf of its opponents. While clearly
Miranda has educated police to a functional knowledge of the fifth
amendment privilege 229 and has made a change in interrogation
U.S. 171 (1975), holding that the silence of a suspect after having received
Miranda warnings may not be admitted at trial for impeachment purposes. Argu·
ably these cases involve the basic exercise of the self-incrimination privilege
rather than Miranda itself. To penalize for silence after having warned a suspect
of his right to remain silent, would appear destructive of the privilege.
226 Oregon v. Mathiason,_ U.S._, 45 U.S.L.W. 3500 (1977); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971). It is interesting to note that Professor Yale Kamisar observed in 1973 that "not only has the Burger Court failed to counter the strong
resistance of law enforcement officials and the lower courts to the Warren Court's
landmark criminal procedure decisions, such as Miranda ... but has actively en·
couraged such resistance." Address by Yale Kamisar, the Second Kenneth J. Hod·
son Lecture in Criminal Law, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army,
Charlottesville, VA (January 25, 1973). In view of the Court's decision in Stone v.
Powell, _
U.S._ (1976), limiting federal review via habeas corpus of state
fourth amendment violations, it seems likely that it will soon limit review of
Miranda violations. Although the Court failed to take the opportunity to substantially modify Miranda in Brewer v. Williams,_ U.S. _ , 45 U.S.L.W. 4287
(1977), Brewer makes it clear that at least five members of the Court are unhappy
with Miranda and would modify it given the proper case.
227
See section XII, supra.
228
A number of appellate courts have distinguished between "voluntariness" violations and Miranda violations in applying the Chapman harmless error rule
rather than the "automatic reversal rule" to Miranda violations. See Smith v.
Estelle, 519 F .2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishes between "coerced" and "unlawful" confessions); Null v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1975) (and
cases cited therein); State v. Magby,_ Ariz._, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976); People v.
Anthony, 38 Ill. App. 3d 427, 347 N.E.2d 770 (1976); State v. Ayers, 16 Oro. App.
300, 518 P.2d 190 (1974); State v. Persuitti, 133 Vt. 354, 339 A.2d 750 (1975);
Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1975). See also Note, Criminal
Law: Applying the Harmless Error Rule to a Confession Obtained in Violation of
Miranda-the Oklahoma View, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 374 (1975); Note, Harmless
Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967) (suggests that Miranda violations could not be harmless).
229

If, ... (Miranda's) impact is seen largely in terms of the educational purposes served by many
Supreme Court rulings, Miranda can be accorded great importance. Regardless of his estimate
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procedures, the studies of Mimnda's actual effects on law enforcement suggest that those effects have been minimal. 230
Miranda's effects should be analyzed from two perspectives-the
degree to which it has hindered law enforcement by preventing confessions or related benefits, 231 and the degree to which it has truly
proven to be a protection against the "inherent coercion of the station house." In both cases Miranda's actual effects appear to have
been minimal. While it has not hurt law enforcement seriously,
neither has it particularly improved the lot of the suspect. 232
Should this be the case, why has Mimnda encountered so much
resistance? While the evidence suggests minimal actual effect, there
can be no question that Mimnda is pe;·ceii,ed as having reduced the
number of statements made and consequently the overall conviction
and case clearance rate. Thus, the popular belief does not correspond with the reality. Further, a number of the studies have inclicated that while police may know the rules, they are frequently unaware of Mimnda's policy intent and its background. Thus, Jack of
education is a significant factor in the opposition to the case. 233 This
of the decision, eaoh officer whom we lnten·iewed d~Fplay«.>d at lea.t rudimentary knm> I...J~e vf
the Fifth Amendment requirements outlined in .lftrando Surh kno\\ledgr, lrrt"5F-<'~ll\e c.f
competing policy considerations, could be an indispeMable pr..requiflte to th~ reoo~.tllon ~r
fundamental rights and the constitutional performance of prore..,ional dutl«.>o In ths. ""'"

0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUU..T 200 ( 1!173).
230
I d., 179-200; Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the .old ministration of
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda 011 Police E.f.fec:luality, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The lm·
plementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970); Nedalie, Zeitz & All:'xander,
Custodial Police Interrogation· in Our Nation's Capital.· The Attempt !o lmple·
ment Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, .\liranda in
Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967); Griffith & Ayrt>s,
A Postscript to the Miranda Project: lnterrogati01z of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE
L.J. 300 (1967); Comment, Interrogation in Nell' Hat•en: The Impact of .\liranda,
76 YALE L.J. 1641 (1967).
231 One commentator found that police in ont> city felt that .Uiranda had ad\'t>rst>
effects "in five areas: (1) in the outcome of formal intt>rrogations. (2) in the collateral functions of interrogation [i.e., implication of accomplices. t<olving other
crimes, recovery of stolen property, and clt>aring suspt>cts], (3) in the amount of
stolen property recovered, (4) in their conviction ratt>, and (5) in tht>ir clt>arnnce
rate." Witt, n.230, supra at 322.
232 See Griffith, n.230 supra. The problem with Miranda as a rt>medy for
psychological coercion is that the warnings, evt>n if propt>rly given, do not appt>ar
to act to diminish the underlying compulsion to coopt>rate and are, therefor~?, val·
ueless. Equally important is the perception of many familiar with police work that
the warnings are given in such a rapid and/or ritualistic fashion, or with Ut<t' of
voice intonations that either threaten or t>mbarrass the suspect, that they art> t>f·
fectively nullified.
233 On the Thursday following the Supreme Court's dt>cision in Ort>gon v.
Mathiason, n.226 supra, the editorial page of the Washington Post carried a stri·
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is particularly important, for Miranda has become a symbol-an
overly simplistic symbol-in the minds of many who view it as a
token of "liberal" support for the rights of criminals in preference to
support for the forces of law and order needed for the continued
survival of society.
Perhaps in reaction, many of those who support the case view it
as one of the truly basic guarantees of freedom in contemporary
civilization, neglecting to note the probability that it has failed to
accomplish its primary purpose. Viewed as a symbol-a symbol that
has never been truly comprehended by most of the countryMiranda's problems may be explained, for Miranda is a handy tool
for police and public who feel abandoned by the judicial process, and
who look for simplistic explanations for the crime problem. After
all, it is easier to blame the courts for coddling criminals, using
Miranda as an example of such anti-social interference, than to
come to grips with the incredibily complicated causation underlying
the ongoing crime rate. Regardless of the reality, however, and regardless of the reasons, there can be little doubt that Miranda lacks
the minimum consensus needed for the continued effective survival
of a Supreme Court decision.
What then of Miranda? It seems highly likely that a procedural
mechanism similar to 18 U.S.C. § 3501 234 or to the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 235 will be
dent editorial criticizing the Court's decision as having further narrowed Miranda
by having limited it to custodial interrogations. Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1977 at
- · If a major newspaper's editorial writers can be so ignorant of the minimum
holding of Miranda, one can only speculate as to the ignorance of layman and
policeman alike.
234
See section XII supra.
235
The Model Code, published in 1975, adopts a quasi-Miranda framework for
questioning suspects prior to appearance at the police station, stating that "the
officer shall warn such person as promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, and in any case before engaging in any sustained questioning" (of his
right to remain silent, and that if he wants a lawyer he will not be questioned until
one is later made available), § 120.2(5)(a), emphasis added, and also prior to interrogation after arrival at the station, § 140.8. The Code also includes limitations on
the period of questioning (normally a limit of five hours questioning at the police
station), §§ 140.8(4) and 130.2; and specifies additional rights such as the right to
communicate with "counsel, relatives or friends" by telephone, §§ 110.2(5)(a) (iii);
130.1(5); and 140.8(1). Further, aspects of the voluntariness doctrine are set forth
as codal sections: §§ 140.2 (deception may not be used to induce a statement by
indicating that a suspect is legally required to make one); 140.3 (abuse, threats, or
denial of necessities may not be used to induce a statement); 140.4 (questioning of
great length, frequency or persistence may not be used to induce a statement;
neither may "any other method which, in light of such person's age, intelligence
and mental and physical condition, unfairly undermines his ability to make 11
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adopted. Under such a mechanism, rights warnings would continue
to be required in one form or another, and requested counsel would
still have to be supplied, but the result of a good faith mistake or
omission would not necessarily be fatal to the resulting evidence's
admissibility. In short, the "new" test to be applied for suppression
will likely be a variant of the "old" voluntariness test. Should this be
the case, Miranda will never be overruled; it will simply be
emasculated.

choice whether to make a statement or otherwise cooperate."). Where the .!!lode I
Code differs radically from Miranda is in the result of a violation of itt-: require·
ments. Unlike the near total ,,!i1·anda exclusion, the .!!lode! Code requires ::<uppret<sion only if the violation was either in violation of the Constitution or "t-:ubt-:tantial." § 150.3(1). "Substantial" violations include those which were "gro;;;;, wilful
and prejudicial to the accused," § 150.3(2)(a), those "of a kind likely to lead accused persons to misunderstand their position or legal rights and to have influenced the accused's decision to make the statement," § 150.3(2)1bl, and tho::<e in
which "the violation created a significant risk that an incriminating statement may
have been untrue," § 150.3(2)(c). Section 150.3(3) sets forth criteria to be used in
determining whether a violation not covered by § 150.3(:!), supra, is "subt-:tantial." The Model Code expressly provides that notwitht-:tanding a violation of its
requirements, consultation with counsel between the time of violation and thE'
time of making the statement makes the violation "non:;ubstantial." If the primary
evidence is to be excluded under the Code, so too will bE- derivative evidencE' unless inevitable discovery can be shown and exclusion is not nE-cE-s;;ary to protect
compliance with the Code, § 150.4. For a brief summary of thl' :.lode! Codl.' tiff'
Vorenberg, A.L.l. Approves Model Code of Prt'·Arraigumeut ProC'edure, IH
A.B.A.J. 1212 (1975).
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